| dc.description.abstract | We discuss whether affordances can be reasons, against the
background of two interlocked considerations: (1) While the
problematic degree of idealization in accounts of reasons
that treat them as mental states speaks in favor of the alter native view which treats them as facts , a cognitive consid eration relationship is still required to account for the
motivating role of reasons. (2) While recent enactive accounts
of cognition hold promise to avoid over-intellectualization of
acting for reasons, these are so far either underdeveloped or
treat reasons as mental states after all . Considering affor dances as reasons promises to strengthen the enactivist
project. We first motivate factualism about reasons, then
introduce enactivism and finally discuss whether affordances
can play the three roles of explanatory, justifying and moti vating reasons. Since we do not take this discussion to be
exhaustive but rather as outlining a research program, we
point to desiderata for further work | vi |
