Can affordances be reasons?

Abstract

We discuss whether affordances can be reasons, against the background of two interlocked considerations: (1) While the problematic degree of idealization in accounts of reasons that treat them as mental states speaks in favor of the alter native view which treats them as facts , a cognitive consid eration relationship is still required to account for the motivating role of reasons. (2) While recent enactive accounts of cognition hold promise to avoid over-intellectualization of acting for reasons, these are so far either underdeveloped or treat reasons as mental states after all . Considering affor dances as reasons promises to strengthen the enactivist project. We first motivate factualism about reasons, then introduce enactivism and finally discuss whether affordances can play the three roles of explanatory, justifying and moti vating reasons. Since we do not take this discussion to be exhaustive but rather as outlining a research program, we point to desiderata for further work