| dc.description.abstract | Katherine Hawley was skeptical about group trust. Her main
reason for this skepticism was that the distinction between
trust and reliance, central to many theories of interpersonal
trust, does not apply to trust in groups. Hawley’s skeptical
arguments successfully shift the burden of proof to those
who wish to continue with a concept of group trust.
Nonetheless, I argue that a commitments account of the
trust/reliance distinction can shoulder that burden.
According to that commitments account, trust is
a distinctive kind of reliance grounded in a positive appraisal
of features of the trustee’s practical rationality, foremost their
commitments and their capacity to act on those commit ments. This is one way we can make sense of the difference
between trusting and relying on individual people. I argue it
is also a way we can make sense | vi |
