Why empathy is an intellectual virtue

dc.contributor.author	Kotsonis, Alkis
dc.contributor.author	Dunne, Gerard
dc.date.accessioned	2023-12-30T03:02:25Z
dc.date.available	2023-12-30T03:02:25Z
dc.date.issued	2022
dc.description.abstract	Our aim in this paper is to argue that empathy is an intellec tual virtue. Empathy enables agents to gain insight into other people’s emotions and beliefs. The agent who possesses this trait is: (i) driven to engage in acts of empathy by her epis temic desires; (ii) takes pleasure in doing so; (iii) is competent at the activity characteristic of empathy; and, (iv) has good judgment as to when it is epistemically appropriate to engage in empathy. After establishing that empathy meets all the necessary conditions to be classified as an intellectual virtue, we proceed to discuss Battaly’s argument according to which empathy is a skill rather than a virtue. We contend, contra Battaly, that the agent who possesses the virtue of empathy: (a) sometimes foregoes opportunities to engage in the activity characteristic of empathy because it is the virtu ous thing to do, (b) does not make deliberate errors, and (c) her actions are always ultimately aiming at epistemic goods.	vi
dc.identifier.uri	https://thuvienso.hoasen.edu.vn/handle/123456789/14741
dc.language.iso	en	vi
dc.publisher	Taylor & Francis	vi
dc.subject	Empathy; intellectual virtues; skills; epistemic goods; virtue epistemology	vi
dc.title	Why empathy is an intellectual virtue	vi
dc.type	Article	vi

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