| dc.description.abstract | Previous philosophical work on distrust in science has argued
that understanding public distrust in science and scientific
interventions requires that we pay careful attention not only
to epistemic considerations (that is, beliefs about science),
but also to values, and the emotional contexts in which
assessments of scientific credibility are made. This is likely
to be a truncated list of relevant factors for understanding
trust/distrust, but these are certainly key areas of concern.
The aim of this paper is not to further innumerate the list of
relevant factors. Rather, it is to map the ways that these key
areas (beliefs, values, and emotions) are related to each
other. These are not distinct categories, but rather they inter act, making our picture of distrust more complicated than we
might otherwise imagine. This discussion will take place in
the context of resistance to medical interventions. Notably,
Ebola interventions in West Africa, HIV/AIDS testing in South
Africa, and vaccines across the world | vi |
