| dc.description.abstract | Time-consciousness theories aim to explain what our experi ences must be like so that we can experience change, succes sion, and other temporally extended events (or at least why
we believe we have such experiences). The most popular and
influential explanations are versions of theories of the spe cious present, which maintain that what we experience
appears to us as temporally extended. However, the role
that specious presents have in bringing about temporal
experiences remains undescribed. The briefly mentioned
suggestions maintain that having temporally extended
experiential content is either necessary or sufficient for hav ing temporal experiences, or that the contents provide input
for separate perceptual processes. In this paper, I argue that
none of these suggestions succeed. Consequently, the the ories of the specious present have not provided a satisfactory
explanation of temporal experiences and their central moti vation is lost. | vi |
