Further exploration of anti-realist intuitions about aesthetic judgment

Abstract

Experimental philosophy of aesthetics has explored to what extent ordinary people are committed to aesthetic realism. Extant work has focused on attitudes to normativism – a key commitment of realist positions in aesthetics – the claim that aesthetic judgments/statements have correctness condi tions, invariant between subjects, such that there is a fact of the matter in cases of aesthetic disagreement. The emerging picture is that ordinary people strongly and almost univer sally reject normativism and thus there is no strong realist tendency in ordinary people’s thinking about the aesthetic. This has been taken to dissolve the traditional puzzle in aesthetics of how to best account for the fact that (a) aes thetic judgments seem intersubjectively valid, while (b) aes thetic experience seems subjective. This paper presents studies which further enrich our understanding of ordinary thinking about the aesthetic: ordinary thinking about the aesthetic may not be so vehement in its rejection of norma tivism; and where previous results suggested that, in many cultures, the dominant trend is to reject correctness condi tions for aesthetic judgments, the current results suggest participants think aesthetic judgments have correctness con ditions (albeit perhaps very finely relativized to specific cir cumstances of judgment).