dc.description.abstract | According to L. A. Paul, the subjective value of an outcome is
normally assessed by running a cognitive model of what it
would be like if that outcome were to occur. However, cog nitive models, along with the expectations in which they
result, are unreliable for application to transformative experi ences because we cannot know what it would be like for an
outcome to occur if we have never experienced it before. This
paper argues that despite their unreliability, expectations are
still important in the case of chosen and unchosen transfor mative experiences because expectations about an outcome
can systematically influence the very experience of that out come. More precisely, empirical research shows that affective
experiences tend to assimilate to affective expectations. In
turn, more positive affective experiences lead, ceteris paribus,
to higher subjective value. Therefore, rational agents con fronting transformative outcomes should form or cultivate
positive/optimistic affective expectations since, all else being
equal, that maximizes subjective value | vi |