dc.description.abstract | Our aim in this paper is to argue that empathy is an intellec tual virtue. Empathy enables agents to gain insight into other
people’s emotions and beliefs. The agent who possesses this
trait is: (i) driven to engage in acts of empathy by her epis temic desires; (ii) takes pleasure in doing so; (iii) is competent
at the activity characteristic of empathy; and, (iv) has good
judgment as to when it is epistemically appropriate to
engage in empathy. After establishing that empathy meets
all the necessary conditions to be classified as an intellectual
virtue, we proceed to discuss Battaly’s argument according to
which empathy is a skill rather than a virtue. We contend,
contra Battaly, that the agent who possesses the virtue of
empathy: (a) sometimes foregoes opportunities to engage in
the activity characteristic of empathy because it is the virtu ous thing to do, (b) does not make deliberate errors, and (c)
her actions are always ultimately aiming at epistemic goods. | vi |