Now showing items 26-30 of 60

    • Implicit bias, intersectionality, compositionality 

      Chamberlain, James; Holroyd, Jules; Jenkins, Ben; Scaife, Robin (Taylor & Francis, 2023-05-16)
      Recent empirical work attempts to investigate how implicit biases target those facing intersectional oppression. This is welcome, since early work on implicit biases focused on single axes of discrimination, such as ...
    • It’s common sense – you don’t need to believe to disagree! 

      Kürthy, Miklós; Bex-Priestley, Graham; Shemmer, Yonatan (Taylor & Francis, 2023-04-13)
      It is often assumed that disagreement only occurs when there is a clash (e.g., inconsistency) between beliefs. In the philosophical literature, this “narrow” view has sometimes been considered the obvious, intuitively ...
    • Making life more interesting: Trust, trustworthiness, and testimonial injustice 

      McGlynn, Aidan (Taylor & Francis, 2023-01-23)
      A theme running through Katherine Hawley’s recent works on trust and trustworthiness is that thinking about the rela tions between these and Miranda Fricker’s notion of testimo nial injustice offers a perspective from ...
    • Moral affordances and the demands of fittingness 

      Peter, Fabienne (Taylor & Francis, 2023-07-17)
      Some situations appear to make moral demands on us – they call for a certain response. How can we account for such paradigmatic moral experiences? And what normative properties or relations are involved? This paper ...
    • Moral progress, knowledge and error: Do people believe in moral objectivity? 

      Pölzler, Thomas; Zijlstra, Lieuwe; Dijkstra, Jacob (Taylor & Francis, 2022-09-16)
      A prevalent assumption in metaethics is that people believe in moral objectivity. If this assumption were true then people should believe in the possibility of objective moral progress, objective moral knowledge, and ...