| dc.description.abstract | A theme running through Katherine Hawley’s recent works
on trust and trustworthiness is that thinking about the rela tions between these and Miranda Fricker’s notion of testimo nial injustice offers a perspective from which we can see
several limitations of Fricker’s own account of testimonial
injustice. This paper clarifies the aspects of Fricker’s account
that Hawley’s criticisms target, focusing on her objections to
Fricker’s proposal that its primary harm involves a kind of
epistemic objectification and her characterization of testimo nial injustice in terms of prejudicial credibility deficits. I also
offer an assessment of the potency of Hawley’s objections,
concluding that they do point to genuine limitations of
Fricker’s account, but that we can appreciate Hawley’s points
without adopting her trust-centric approach to testimonial
injustice, or her specific commitment-based accounts of trust
and trustworthiness. However, in the last section I examine
the positive picture of testimonial injustice that emerges
from Hawley’s discussion of unequally distributed obstacles
to both being trustworthy and maintaining a reputation for
trustworthy testimony in her recent book How To Be
Trustworthy, considering how this picture contrasts with
Fricker’s account and where it might have important affinities
with other accounts in the literature. | vi |
