

GAMES AND INFORMATION, FOURTH EDITION

An Introduction to Game Theory

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(starred sections are less important)

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¹xxx February 2, 2000. December 12, 2003. 24 March 2005. Eric Rasmusen, Erasmuse@indiana.edu. <http://www.rasmusen.org/GI> Footnotes starting with xxx are the author's notes to himself. Comments are welcomed.

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