

Microeconomics of Banking

Second Edition

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Contents

List of Figures	xv
Preface	xvii
1 Introduction	1
1.1 What Is a Bank, and What Do Banks Do?	1
1.2 Liquidity and Payment Services	2
1.2.1 Money Changing	3
1.2.2 Payment Services	4
1.3 Transforming Assets	4
1.4 Managing Risks	5
1.4.1 Credit Risk	5
1.4.2 Interest Rate and Liquidity Risks	5
1.4.3 Off-Balance-Sheet Operations	6
1.5 Monitoring and Information Processing	6
1.6 The Role of Banks in the Resource Allocation Process	7
1.7 Banking in the Arrow-Debreu Model	7
1.7.1 The Consumer	8
1.7.2 The Firm	9
1.7.3 The Bank	9
1.7.4 General Equilibrium	9
1.8 Outline of the Book	10
2 The Role of Financial Intermediaries	15
2.1 Transaction Costs	18
2.1.1 Economies of Scope	18
2.1.2 Economies of Scale	19
2.2 Coalitions of Depositors and Liquidity Insurance	20
2.2.1 The Model	20

2.2.2	Characteristics of the Optimal Allocation	21
2.2.3	Autarky	21
2.2.4	Market Economy	22
2.2.5	Financial Intermediation	23
2.3	Coalitions of Borrowers and the Cost of Capital	24
2.3.1	A Simple Model of Capital Markets with Adverse Selection	25
2.3.2	Signaling through Self-Financing and the Cost of Capital	26
2.3.3	Coalitions of Borrowers	28
2.3.4	Suggestions for Further Reading	28
2.4	Financial Intermediation as Delegated Monitoring	30
2.5	The Choice between Market Debt and Bank Debt	34
2.5.1	A Simple Model of the Credit Market with Moral Hazard	34
2.5.2	Monitoring and Reputation	36
2.5.3	Monitoring and Capital	39
2.5.4	Financial Architecture	42
2.5.5	Credit Risk and Dilution Costs	43
2.6	Liquidity Provision to Firms	46
2.7	Suggestions for Further Reading	47
2.8	Problems	49
2.8.1	Strategic Entrepreneurs and Market Financing	49
2.8.2	Market versus Bank Finance	50
2.8.3	Economies of Scale in Information Production	50
2.8.4	Monitoring as a Public Good and Gresham's Law	51
2.8.5	Intermediation and Search Costs	52
2.8.6	Intertemporal Insurance	53
2.9	Solutions	54
2.9.1	Strategic Entrepreneurs and Market Financing	54
2.9.2	Market versus Bank Finance	55
2.9.3	Economies of Scale in Information Production	57
2.9.4	Monitoring as a Public Good and Gresham's Law	58
2.9.5	Intermediation and Search Costs	60
2.9.6	Intertemporal Insurance	62
3	The Industrial Organization Approach to Banking	69
3.1	A Model of a Perfect Competitive Banking Sector	70
3.1.1	The Model	70

3.1.2	The Credit Multiplier Approach	71
3.1.3	The Behavior of Individual Banks in a Competitive Banking Sector	72
3.1.4	The Competitive Equilibrium of the Banking Sector	75
3.2	The Monti-Klein Model of a Monopolistic Bank	78
3.2.1	The Original Model	78
3.2.2	The Oligopolistic Version	79
3.2.3	Empirical Evidence	80
3.3	Monopolistic Competition	81
3.3.1	Does Free Competition Lead to the Optimal Number of Banks?	81
3.3.2	The Impact of Deposit Rate Regulation on Credit Rates	84
3.3.3	Bank Network Compatibility	87
3.3.4	Empirical Evidence	88
3.4	The Scope of the Banking Firm	88
3.5	Beyond Price Competition	89
3.5.1	Risk Taking on Investments	89
3.5.2	Monitoring and Incentives in a Financial Conglomerate	93
3.5.3	Competition and Screening	95
3.6	Relationship Banking	99
3.6.1	The Ex Post Monopoly of Information	99
3.6.2	Equilibrium with Screening and Relationship Banking	102
3.6.3	Does Competition Threaten Relationship Banking?	103
3.6.4	Intertemporal Insurance	104
3.6.5	Empirical Tests of Relationship Banking	104
3.7	Payment Cards and Two-Sided Markets	107
3.7.1	A Model of the Payment Card Industry	108
3.7.2	Card Use	109
3.7.3	Monopoly Network	110
3.7.4	Competing Payment Card Networks	111
3.7.5	Welfare Analysis	111
3.8	Problems	112
3.8.1	Extension of the Monti-Klein Model to the Case of Risky Loans	112
3.8.2	Compatibility between Banking Networks	113
3.8.3	Double Bertrand Competition	113
3.8.4	Deposit Rate Regulation	114

3.9	Solutions	115
3.9.1	Extension of the Monti-Klein Model to the Case of Risky Loans	115
3.9.2	Compatibility between Banking Networks	116
3.9.3	Double Bertrand Competition	117
3.9.4	Deposit Rate Regulation	118
4	The Lender-Borrower Relationship	127
4.1	Why Risk Sharing Does Not Explain All the Features of Bank Loans	128
4.2	Costly State Verification	130
4.2.1	Incentive-Compatible Contracts	131
4.2.2	Efficient Incentive-Compatible Contracts	132
4.2.3	Efficient Falsification-Proof Contracts	133
4.3	Incentives to Repay	134
4.3.1	Nonpecuniary Cost of Bankruptcy	134
4.3.2	Threat of Termination	135
4.3.3	Impact of Judicial Enforcement	137
4.3.4	Strategic Debt Repayment: The Case of a Sovereign Debtor	139
4.4	Moral Hazard	143
4.5	The Incomplete Contract Approach	146
4.5.1	Private Debtors and the Inalienability of Human Capital	147
4.5.2	Liquidity of Assets and Debt Capacity	149
4.5.3	Soft Budget Constraints and Financial Structure	150
4.6	Collateral as a Device for Screening Heterogeneous Borrowers	153
4.7	Problems	157
4.7.1	Optimal Risk Sharing with Symmetric Information	157
4.7.2	Optimal Debt Contracts with Moral Hazard	158
4.7.3	The Optimality of Stochastic Auditing Schemes	159
4.7.4	The Role of Hard Claims in Constraining Management	160
4.7.5	Collateral and Rationing	160
4.7.6	Securitization	161
4.8	Solutions	161
4.8.1	Optimal Risk Sharing with Symmetric Information	161
4.8.2	Optimal Debt Contracts with Moral Hazard	162
4.8.3	The Optimality of Stochastic Auditing Schemes	163
4.8.4	The Role of Hard Claims in Constraining Management	164

4.8.5	Collateral and Rationing	164
4.8.6	Securitization	165
5	Equilibrium in the Credit Market and Its Macroeconomic Implications	171
5.1	Definition of Equilibrium Credit Rationing	172
5.2	The Backward-Bending Supply of Credit	173
5.3	Equilibrium Credit Rationing	175
5.3.1	Adverse Selection	175
5.3.2	Costly State Verification	177
5.3.3	Moral Hazard	178
5.4	Equilibrium with a Broader Class of Contracts	181
5.5	Problems	185
5.5.1	The Model of Mankiw	185
5.5.2	Efficient Credit Rationing	185
5.5.3	Too Much Investment	186
5.6	Solutions	186
5.6.1	The Model of Mankiw	186
5.6.2	Efficient Credit Rationing	187
5.6.3	Too Much Investment	188
6	The Macroeconomic Consequences of Financial Imperfections	193
6.1	A Short Historical Perspective	195
6.2	The Transmission Channels of Monetary Policy	196
6.2.1	The Different Channels	197
6.2.2	A Simple Model	198
6.2.3	Credit View versus Money View: Justification of the Assumptions and Empirical Evidence	200
6.2.4	Empirical Evidence on the Credit View	202
6.3	Financial Fragility and Economic Performance	203
6.4	Financial Development and Economic Growth	209
7	Individual Bank Runs and Systemic Risk	217
7.1	Banking Deposits and Liquidity Insurance	218
7.1.1	A Model of Liquidity Insurance	218
7.1.2	Autarky	219
7.1.3	The Allocation Obtained When a Financial Market Is Opened	219
7.1.4	The Optimal (Symmetric) Allocation	220
7.1.5	A Fractional Reserve Banking System	220

7.2	The Stability of the Fractional Reserve System and Alternative Institutional Arrangements	222
7.2.1	The Causes of Instability	222
7.2.2	A First Remedy for Instability: Narrow Banking	222
7.2.3	Regulatory Responses: Suspension of Convertibility or Deposit Insurance	224
7.2.4	Jacklin's Proposal: Equity versus Deposits	225
7.3	Bank Runs and Renegotiation	227
7.3.1	A Simple Model	227
7.3.2	Pledgeable and Nonpledgeable Cash Flows	228
7.3.3	Bank Runs as a Discipline Device	228
7.3.4	The Role of Capital	229
7.4	Efficient Bank Runs	230
7.5	Interbank Markets and the Management of Idiosyncratic Liquidity Shocks	233
7.5.1	The Model of Bhattacharya and Gale	233
7.5.2	The Role of the Interbank Market	234
7.5.3	The Case of Unobservable Liquidity Shocks	234
7.6	Systemic Risk and Contagion	235
7.6.1	Aggregate Liquidity and Banking Crises	236
7.6.2	Payment Systems and OTC Operations	238
7.6.3	Contagion through Interbank Claims	239
7.7	Lender of Last Resort: A Historical Perspective	242
7.7.1	Views on the LLR Role	243
7.7.2	Liquidity and Solvency: A Coordination Game	244
7.7.3	The Practice of LLR Assistance	246
7.7.4	The Effect of LLR and Other Partial Arrangements	247
7.8	Problems	248
7.8.1	Bank Runs and Moral Hazard	248
7.8.2	Bank Runs	249
7.8.3	Information-Based Bank Runs	249
7.8.4	Banks' Suspension of Convertibility	250
7.8.5	Aggregated Liquidity Shocks	251
7.8.6	Charter Value	252
7.9	Solutions	253
7.9.1	Banks Runs and Moral Hazard	253
7.9.2	Bank Runs	253

7.9.3	Information-Based Bank Runs	255
7.9.4	Banks' Suspension of Convertibility	255
7.9.5	Aggregated Liquidity Shocks	257
7.9.6	Charter Value	258
8	Managing Risks in the Banking Firm	265
8.1	Credit Risk	266
8.1.1	Institutional Context	266
8.1.2	Evaluating the Cost of Credit Risk	267
8.1.3	Regulatory Response to Credit Risk	271
8.2	Liquidity Risk	273
8.2.1	Reserve Management	274
8.2.2	Introducing Liquidity Risk into the Monti-Klein Model	275
8.2.3	The Bank as a Market Maker	277
8.3	Interest Rate Risk	280
8.3.1	The Term Structure of Interest Rates	281
8.3.2	Measuring Interest Rate Risk Exposure	283
8.3.3	Applications to Asset Liability Management	284
8.4	Market Risk	286
8.4.1	Portfolio Theory: The Capital Asset Pricing Model	286
8.4.2	The Bank as a Portfolio Manager: The Pyle-Hart-Jaffee Approach	288
8.4.3	An Application of the Portfolio Model: The Impact of Capital Requirements	291
8.5	Problems	296
8.5.1	The Model of Prisman, Slovin, and Sushka	296
8.5.2	The Risk Structure of Interest Rates	297
8.5.3	Using the CAPM for Loan Pricing	298
8.6	Solutions	298
8.6.1	The Model of Prisman, Slovin, and Sushka	298
8.6.2	The Risk Structure of Interest Rates	300
8.6.3	Using the CAPM for Loan Pricing	301
9	The Regulation of Banks	305
9.1	The Justification for Banking Regulation	306
9.1.1	The General Setting	306
9.1.2	The Fragility of Banks	307
9.1.3	The Protection of Depositors' and Customers' Confidence	308
9.1.4	The Cost of Bank Failures	310

9.2	A Framework for Regulatory Analysis	310
9.3	Deposit Insurance	313
9.3.1	The Moral Hazard Issue	313
9.3.2	Risk-Related Insurance Premiums	315
9.3.3	Is Fairly Priced Deposit Insurance Possible?	316
9.3.4	The Effects of Deposit Insurance on the Banking Industry	318
9.4	Solvency Regulations	319
9.4.1	The Portfolio Approach	319
9.4.2	Cost of Bank Capital and Deposit Rate Regulation	320
9.4.3	The Incentive Approach	323
9.4.4	The Incomplete Contract Approach	324
9.4.5	The Three Pillars of Basel II	328
9.5	The Resolution of Bank Failures	329
9.5.1	Resolving Banks' Distress: Instruments and Policies	329
9.5.2	Information Revelation and Managers' Incentives	330
9.5.3	Who Should Decide on Banks' Closure?	332
9.6	Market Discipline	335
9.6.1	Theoretical Framework	336
9.6.2	Empirical Evidence	337
9.7	Suggestions for Further Reading	338
9.8	Problem	340
9.8.1	Moral Hazard and Capital Regulation	340
9.9	Solution	340
9.9.1	Moral Hazard and Capital Regulation	340
	Index	349

Figures

1.1	Financial decisions of economic agents.	8
2.1	Bank balance sheet in Bryant-Diamond-Dybvig paradigm.	24
2.2	Direct finance: Each lender monitors its borrower (total cost nmK).	31
2.3	Intermediated finance: Delegated monitoring (total cost $nK + C_n$).	32
2.4	Firms categorized by type of finance.	42
2.5	Optimal financing choices of firms.	46
3.1	Increments in aggregated balances of various agents.	72
3.2	Locations on Salop circle.	83
3.3	Costs and benefits of a card transaction.	108
4.1	Optimality of the standard debt contract under costly state verification.	133
4.2	Optimality of the standard debt contract under nonpecuniary costs of bankruptcy.	135
4.3	Underinvestment in the case of a strategic debtor (Allen 1983).	140
4.4	Optimal contract in Innes (1987) moral hazard model.	145
4.5	Borrowers' indifference curves: low risks Δ^L , high risks Δ^H .	154
4.6	Optimal menu of loan contracts.	156
4.7	Pareto frontiers with deterministic and stochastic audits.	164
5.1	Expected return to the bank as a function of nominal rate of loan.	173
5.2	Equilibrium credit rationing.	174
5.3	Profit to the firm as a function of cash flow from project.	176
5.4	Expected return to the bank as a function of R in Bester-Hellwig (1987) model: Case 1.	179
5.5	Expected return to the bank as a function of R in Bester-Hellwig (1987) model: Case 2.	180
5.6	Separating equilibrium in Bester (1985) model: The only candidate is (γ_L^*, γ_H^*) .	182

5.7a	Separating equilibrium in Bester (1985) model: Equilibrium exists.	184
5.7b	Separating equilibrium in Bester (1985) model: Equilibrium does not exist.	184
6.1	Timing in Bernanke-Gertler (1990) model.	205
7.1	Different sets of contracts.	226
7.2	Debt deflation.	236
7.3	Two examples of interbank borrowing architecture.	241
9.1	Banking regulation in perspective.	311
9.2	Best and second-best decision rules (Dewatripont and Tirole 1994, 8.66).	328
9.3	Closure policies.	335