

RESEARCH ARTICLE

The cultural influence on employees' preferences for reward allocation rules: A two-wave survey study in 28 countries

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Abstract

Multinational organisations and government organisations experienced problems introducing a merit pay system in different countries. Designing the right reward system is challenging in an international work environment, because employees often have different expectations about reward allocations. Most prior research predicted that individualistic employees prefer equity as allocation rule for rewards, while collectivistic employees prefer equality as allocation rule. However, prior research could not confirm this prediction. To expand prior research, we integrate cultural value theory and allocation rule research to examine if employees' culture-inspired personal values influence their preferred allocation rule. We conducted a two-wave study with 3432 employees from 28 countries. The results show that employees' cultural value orientations are related to their preferred allocation rules. Further, supervisors are not only considered fair if they distribute outcomes based on employees' task performance but also based on equality or extra-role performance.

KEYWORDS

allocation rules, compensation, culture-inspired personal values, distributive fairness, international HRM, multinational organisations, reward allocation

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Practitioner notes

What is currently known about the subject matter?

- Multinational organisations experience issues introducing merit pay in different countries.
- National governments experience difficulties replacing seniority-based systems with merit pay for public employees.
- We observe heated debates about income inequality in some countries, whereas people in other countries tend to accept income inequality.
- To analyse how employees evaluate allocations of rewards, most research focussed on equity as allocation rule, neglecting other allocation rules.
- Previous research is characterised by inconsistent findings about the impact of individualism-collectivism on allocation rule preferences.

What the paper adds to this?

- We integrate cultural value research with allocation rule research to understand why employees' preferences for allocation rules differ.
- The results of a two-wave survey study with 3432 employees from 28 countries show that employees' culture-inspired personal values influence their preferred allocation rule.
- We provide explanations for the inconsistent findings of prior research by showing the importance to distinguish between task and extra-role performance to allocate rewards.
- We show that not only task performance but also equality and extra-role performance are appropriate criteria for reward allocations.

Implications of study findings for practitioners

- To create effective reward systems, organisations can adapt their reward allocation based on their employees' cultural-inspired personal values.
- Multinational organisations need to be particularly sensitive to allocation rule issues because their workforce often has different cultural value orientations and expectations about reward allocations.
- Supervisors do not need to distribute outcomes among employees based on task performance to be perceived as effective and fair by employees.
- Supervisors might be also considered fair if they distribute outcomes based on equality or extra-role performance.

1 | INTRODUCTION

The globalisation of business has changed the organizational landscape (Contractor, 2022; Filatotchev et al., 2019; Rode et al., 2016). New business opportunities align with new challenges for management (Adamovic, 2018; Caprar et al., 2022; Qin et al., 2022). An important and challenging task for organisations is the design of reward systems (Amadi et al., 2021; Bayo-Moriones et al., 2022; Nyberg et al., 2016, 2018; Park & Sturman, 2016). This task is particularly challenging for multinational organisations because employees in today's globalised business world often have different cultural backgrounds and therefore different expectations about reward allocations (Frank et al., 2015; Načinović Braje et al., 2019; Olsen, 2015; Prince et al., 2020; Scott et al., 2015). Employee compensation is an important motivation tool (Caza et al., 2015; Gahan et al., 2021; Hewett & Leroy, 2019; Morand et al., 2019; Park & Kruse, 2013; Parker et al., 2019) and at the same time the largest operation cost for many organisations (Gerhart et al., 2009). To design effective reward systems, managers and organisations need to better understand their employees' preferences for reward allocation rules. Creating a better understanding of allocation rules will help

organisations to attract more talented employees, retain their current employees, and enhance employee motivation (Scott et al., 2015; Shaw & Gupta, 2015; Shaw & Zhou, 2021).

An important question in international human resource management (HRM) research is whether multinational organisations need to adapt their reward management practices across cultures (Caprar et al., 2022; Farndale et al., 2020). Prior research reported that multinational organisations experience problems when they introduce a merit pay system as reward system in different countries (Adamovic, 2018; Bartram et al., 2015; Ferner & Almond, 2012; Gooderham et al., 2018). For example, when Amazon first operated in Germany, its pay and management practices were strongly criticised by its employees, the media, politicians, and the general public (The Wall Street Journal, 2013). Employees went on strike and many German customers boycotted Amazon (Huffington Post, 2013; The Wall Street Journal, 2014). Not only have multinational organisations experienced difficulties implementing merit pay systems across cultures but national governments experience similar problems (Bae, 2021; Bryson et al., 2017; Mariani et al., 2021). Governments in Asian countries have tried to introduce a merit pay system for public employees to replace traditional seniority-based systems. However, public employees often rejected merit pay. For example, public employees in South Korea rejected merit pay in 2016 and responded with the largest strikes that the country had ever seen (BusinessKorea, 2016a, b; The Korea Times, 2016). Further, income differences between rich and poor increase in most countries (Park & Kim, 2021). We observe in some countries heated debates and demonstrations about income inequality and the high pay of CEOs, whereas people in other cultures tend to accept the income inequality and a high pay of CEOs (Frank et al., 2015; Schmid et al., 2018). Understanding the reasons for the differences in employees' preferences for allocation rules will help managers and organisations to implement more effective reward systems and outcome allocations.

To understand the cultural influence on reward allocations, we conduct a survey study in 28 countries about employees' allocation rule preferences to distribute outcomes such as pay, salary, and promotion. This allows us to make two main contributions. First, we aim to understand why employees' preferences for reward allocations differ. For this purpose, we draw on cultural value theory (Oyserman et al., 2002; Vignoles et al., 2016) and analyse if employees' preferences for allocation rules depend on their culture-inspired personal values (Figure 1). Allocating rewards in a fair way is desired by most people from different countries, but the definition, interpretation, and implementation of a fair allocation can differ across cultures (Fu et al., 2020; Leung, 2005). We all know that what is considered fair in one culture might be considered unfair in another (Fischer et al., 2011, 2016; Jiang et al., 2017; Shao et al., 2013; Silva & Caetano, 2016). Different cultural values create different fairness expectations (Beugré, 2007; James, 2015), making the investigation of allocations across cultures an important topic. Analysing if employees' preferences for reward systems differ across employees with different cultural backgrounds helps HR managers to design fairer reward systems and to decide if reward systems must be adapted across cultures.




FIGURE 1 Culture-inspired personal values and allocation rules.

Second, drawing on prior research on allocation rules (Bolino & Turnley, 2008; Deutsch, 1985; Jany, 2021; Olsen, 2015) we aim to clarify inconsistent findings of prior research. Several cross-cultural studies reported that individualism relates to a preference for an equity rule while collectivism relates to a preference for an equality rule (Hysom & Fişek, 2011; James, 2015; Otto et al., 2011; Ramamoorthy et al., 2019; Silva & Caetano, 2016; Taras & Rowney, 2008). However, several studies also reported non-significant effects of individualism and collectivism on both allocation rules (Bolino & Turnley, 2008; Fischer & Smith, 2003; Gelfand et al., 2007; James, 2015; Silva & Caetano, 2016). To solve this puzzle, we focus on the distinction between task versus extra-role performance. This distinction is important, because individualistic and collectivistic employees may both value equity as allocation rule (Gelfand et al., 2007). We argue that individualistic employees prefer task performance-based equity, whereas collectivistic employees prefer extra-role performance-based equity.

2 | PREVIOUS RESEARCH ON REWARD ALLOCATION RULES

To analyse the allocation of outcomes such as pay, bonus, and promotion, prior research often draws on equity theory (Adams, 1965), which assumes that inputs (quality of work, productivity, effort, etc.) and outputs (salary, bonus, promotion, etc.) are exchanged between the two actors (Adams, 1965; Ambrose & Arnaud, 2005; Bolino & Turnley, 2008). Prior research identified the following inputs: Performance, quality of work, productivity, contribution, effectiveness, quantity, work effort, skill level, commitment, loyalty, and having good relationships with coworkers and supervisors (Adams, 1965; Ambrose & Arnaud, 2005; Fischer, 2016; Fischer & Smith, 2003; Leung, 2005; Leung & Tong, 2004; Törnblom, 1992; Törnblom & Kazemi, 2011).

Initial research also identified three allocation rules that supervisor can use allocate rewards: (1) equity, (2) equality, and (3) need (Deutsch, 1975, 1985; see also Hassan & Ahmed, 2019). The ratio of inputs and outcomes therefore determines the perceived fairness of a reward allocation. According to the equity rule, employees perceive the exchange of inputs and outputs as fair, if employees with the greatest inputs receive the greatest outputs (Bachkirov & Shamsudin, 2017; Colquitt, Scott, et al., 2013). However, the application of other allocation rules, such as equality and need, to distribute outcomes is also possible (see also Day et al., 2014; Fischer, 2016; Jany, 2021; Morand & Merriman, 2012; Olsen, 2015; Prince et al., 2020; Törnblom & Kazemi, 2011). Prior research suggests that, in collectivistic cultures, managers apply equality as the allocation rule to distribute outcomes equally among employees, independently of their inputs (Beugré, 2007; Kim & Gong, 2009; Leung, 2005; Morand et al., 2019; Olsen, 2015). If need is the allocation rule, managers distribute outcomes to those who have the greatest difficulties or needs of receiving the outcomes (Deutsch, 1985; Leung, 2005; Murphy-Berman & Berman, 2002). This means “the need rule mandates that organizational members receive allocations depending on their personal need” (Fischer, 2004, p. 152). For example, if an employee suffers from financial problems and the organisation decides to distribute a bonus to its workforce, the application of the need rule would mean that supervisors should allocate the bonus to an employee with financial problems. This allocation of outcomes takes the personal situation of employees into account.

Based on job performance research (Befort & Hatrup, 2003; Lee & Allen, 2002; Mishra & Roch, 2017; Welbourne et al., 1998), equity can be classified into task and extra-role performance-based equity to create a more fine-grained understanding. This distinction will help to clarify the inconsistent findings of previous cross-cultural research on allocation rules. Job performance research has shown that not only an employee's task performance is a crucial factor of an employee's performance but also an employee's extra-role performance such as work effort, loyalty, helping coworkers, and maintaining good relationships with coworkers.

Applying task performance as basis for an allocation means that supervisors reward employees with the highest task performance in terms of a better quality of work, productivity, and provision of more important contributions (Ancona & Caldwell, 1992; Hempel et al., 2009; Mishra & Roch, 2017; Van Der Vegt & Bunderson, 2005). In contrast, applying extra-role performance as a basis for an allocation means that supervisors reward employees who score high on extra-role performance in terms of work effort, loyalty, and commitment (Befort & Hatrup, 2003;

Lee & Allen, 2002; Van der Vegt et al., 2003; Welbourne et al., 1998). The distinction between task and extra-role performance for the equity rule is in line with prior research about allocation rules that has classified equity into two sub-dimensions. Bolino and Turnley (2008) distinguish between task-performance contributions (similar to task performance-based equity) and contextual-performance contributions (similar to extra-role performance-based equity) in assessing equity. Similarly, Törnblom and Kazemi (2011) and Hundley and Kim (1997) distinguish between performance and effort as dimensions of equity. Finally, Cugueró-Escofet and Fortin (2022) provide empirical support for the distinction between equity of input and equity of output.

Prior research in high power distance cultures suggests another allocation rule and that outcomes can be distributed based on an employee's status, which is often ascribed to employees in these cultures based on attributes like their position in the organizational hierarchy, seniority, age, and organizational tenure (Bolino & Turnley, 2008; Conlon et al., 2004; Earley, 1999; Fischer, 2016; Fisek & Hysom, 2008; Rowley et al., 2004). Taken together, all the presented criteria (i.e., task performance, extra-role performance, equality, need, and status) can be used to allocate rewards. To explain which allocation rules employees prefer, we draw on cultural value research.

3 | REVIEW OF CULTURAL VALUE RESEARCH AT THE INDIVIDUAL LEVEL

To capture the influence of an employee's cultural background on her or his preferences for allocation rules, we analyse cultural values at the individual level of analysis (see also Adamovic, 2022; Fischer & Poortinga, 2012; Markus & Kitayama, 1991; Meglino & Ravlin, 1998; Oyserman et al., 2002; Travaglino & Moon, 2020; Tsui et al., 2007; Vignoles et al., 2016). Culture in management research is often equated with cultural values (House et al., 2004; Kirkman et al., 2006, 2017; Rattrie et al., 2020; Steel et al., 2018; Taras et al., 2010). Values at the individual level are often called culture-inspired personal values or cultural value orientations (Kirkman et al., 2009) and can be defined as assumptions of individuals that are influenced by their cultural background and that guide their thinking and behaviour (Oyserman et al., 2002). Traditionally, cross-cultural research tends to aggregate cultural values at the national level, or to rely on aggregated scores collected from previous studies (Devinney & Hohberger, 2017; Hofstede, 2001; Steel et al., 2018). Yet, numerous scholars argued that the individual level is also an appropriate and important level of analysis for values (e.g., Dorfman & Howell, 1988; Fischer & Poortinga, 2012; Jackson et al., 2006; Kirkman et al., 2006, 2017; Meglino & Ravlin, 1998; Taras et al., 2010). Prior research also questions whether nations represent a better unit of analysis for value research (Fischer & Poortinga, 2012; Markus & Kitayama, 1991; Taras et al., 2016). For example, only 3%–18% of the variance in cultural values exists between nations, compared to 82%–92% within nations (depending on the considered cultural value dimension) (Steel & Taras, 2010). In our globalised and diverse world (Adamovic, 2020; Adamovic & Leibbrandt, 2022; Olsen et al., 2022), many different sub-groups exist within countries, making the measurement of values at the individual level a relevant issue. Not everyone adheres to the salient cultural values of her or his country. For example, the common classification of Asian countries as collectivistic countries does not mean that every Asian works, thinks, and acts in a collectivistic way. Therefore, we analyse culture-inspired personal values at the individual level.

In this manuscript, we use Hofstede's cultural value dimensions at the individual level, because they are widely used in allocation rule research (Beugré, 2007; Kirkman et al., 2006, 2017; Leung, 2005; Shao et al., 2013). Although many cultural value frameworks and approaches to measure culture exist (Devinney & Hohberger, 2017; Moonen, 2017; Shan et al., 2019), a meta-analysis has shown that Hofstede's framework is still the most widely used framework in cross-cultural research and has been tested and confirmed in numerous countries (Taras et al., 2010). Hofstede's framework is based on four dimensions: collectivism-individualism, power distance, masculinity-femininity, and uncertainty avoidance. Collectivism-individualism is defined by Hofstede (1994, p. 6) as the extent to which people 'prefer to act as individuals rather than as members of groups.' Power distance represents the extent to which individuals accept and tolerate power differences (e.g., between managers and employees) in the workplace (Hofstede et al., 2010). Uncertainty avoidance describes the extent to which employees need clear instructions and rules to

reduce uncertainty in the workplace. Finally, masculinity–femininity refers to a person's attitude towards gender equality and distinguishes between so-called masculine (e.g., competition and assertiveness) and feminine (e.g., cooperation and caring) values. Although Hofstede's original work was conducted at the country level (1980), subsequent work has adapted and confirmed Hofstede's value dimensions at the individual level (e.g., Adamovic, 2022; Dorfman & Howell, 1988; Kirkman et al., 2006, 2017; Oyserman et al., 2002; Triandis et al., 1988; Tsui et al., 2007; Vignoles et al., 2016; Vitell et al., 2003).

4 | HYPOTHESES AND THEORETICAL BACKGROUND

Based on value theory (Hofstede, 2001; Oyserman et al., 2002; Vignoles et al., 2016) and allocation rule research (Bolino & Turnley, 2008; Deutsch, 1985; Fischer, 2004; Olsen, 2015), we argue that people with different culture-inspired personal values are likely to prefer different allocation rules. In the following, we explain the relationships between culture-inspired personal values and preferences for allocation rules.

4.1 | Culture-inspired personal values and task performance-based equity

We suggest that employees with an individualism orientation prefer task performance as a basis for reward allocations. Employees who are high in individualism tend to define their personal self based on individual characteristics (Markus & Kitayama, 1991; Vignoles et al., 2016). These employees often act and think in congruence with their individual beliefs and attitudes independently of the group's beliefs and attitudes (Jackson et al., 2006). They further tend to put a higher value on the achievement of personal goals than on the goals of the group (Dorfman & Howell, 1988; Fischer et al., 2009). Because of this individualistic and instrumental approach to work, it might be important for these employees that individual task performance is recognized and rewarded (Beugré, 2007; Bolino & Turnley, 2008). Therefore, they are likely to prefer task performance as a criterion for rewards. They may also believe that rewarding individual performance is more effective for organizational functioning than providing collective rewards. This theoretical prediction is line with prior research about individualism and reward allocations (Fischer, 2016; James, 2015; Olsen, 2015; Silva & Caetano, 2016).

Hypothesis 1a *Employees with high individualism scores prefer that rewards are allocated based on task performance.*

Hypothesis 1b *Employees with high masculinity scores prefer that rewards are allocated based on task performance.*

Employees with a masculinity orientation tend to think that men are superior to women in certain occupations and leadership roles, and they are often motivated by achievement, assertiveness, competition, success, performance, and winning (Ellemers, 2018; Hofstede et al., 2010). They are motivated to work harder if their work environment *emphasises* these value attributes (Avsec, 2003; Vitell et al., 2003). This instrumental performance orientation makes it likely that these employees prefer allocations that are based on task performance (Olsen, 2015). To them, it appears, that only the results count, and not the pathway to achieving the results. Task relevant criteria and results like task performance and quality of results are therefore likely to be preferred as basis for reward allocations (Beugré, 2007). Employees with a masculine orientation may *favour* allocations that reward merit and *recognise* their accomplishment. This will provide them with the feeling that their individual task performance contributed to their received outcome.

Employees high in uncertainty avoidance are considered to feel uncomfortable if they experience uncertainty in their workplace (De Luque & Javidan, 2004). They may try to reduce uncertainty through formal rules, standards, and rules that standardise their work and create clear expectations regarding tasks and goals (De Luque & Javidan, 2004; Rapp et al., 2011). People high in uncertainty avoidance may need a clear structure in the workplace that creates

predictability. To reduce uncertainty in the workplace, it is likely that these employees value task performance as a basis for allocations. By allocating outcomes based on task performance, employees high in uncertainty avoidance can reduce their uncertainty about outcomes, because it is easier for them to influence and control their individual task performance and they do not depend on their coworkers. The application of a task performance-based equity rule may therefore reduce uncertainty regarding what an individual employee will receive. Further, employees, who value clear guidelines and rules, might be conscientious employees who are hard-working with a high-performance orientation. As a result, they might value task performance-based equity to recognise their individual performance.

Hypothesis 1c *Employees with high uncertainty avoidance scores prefer that rewards are allocated based on task performance.*

4.2 | Culture-inspired personal values and extra-role performance-based equity

We predict that employees with a collectivism orientation are likely to prefer extra-role performance as a basis for reward allocations. The effective functioning of the group is often more important to these employees than their personal interests (Fischer et al., 2009) and group rules are considered a standard of appropriate behaviour (Jackson et al., 2006). As the work group is often important for employees with a collectivism orientation, it is likely they value extra-role performance to reward employees who care about the success and well-being of the group. Exercising high work effort indicates loyalty and commitment to the team and organisation (Ouwkerk et al., 1999). Work effort and showing commitment to the organisation should be therefore the basis for the allocation of outcomes for employees with a collectivism orientation (Beugré, 2007; Leung, 2005). Our theorising is in line with prior research which indicates that employees with a collectivism orientation seem to be more willing to sacrifice personal goals to achieve group goals (Chen et al., 2002; Dorfman & Howell, 1988).

Hypothesis 2a *Employees with high collectivism scores prefer that rewards are allocated based on extra-role performance.*

In addition, we argue that power distance will be positively related with a preference for extra-role performance-based equity. Employees with a power distance orientation tend to accept and tolerate status differences in the workplace (Carl et al., 2004; Hofstede et al., 2010). They tend to respect the higher status of their managers and often hesitate to challenge them and their status (Anand et al., 2018; Liu et al., 2013). Employees with a power distance orientation may therefore consider it as their obligation to engage in extra-role performance to support their supervisors and to show their loyalty to them (Farh et al., 2007).

Hypothesis 2b *Employees with high power distance scores prefer that rewards are allocated based on extra-role performance.*

4.3 | Culture-inspired personal values and equality

When allocating outcomes, the equality rule means that all employees receive the same outcome, independently of their performance (Deutsch, 1985; Leung, 2005; Morand & Merriman, 2012). The allocation of outcomes is therefore based on the principle of equality and not equity. We argue that employees with a collectivism orientation and employees with a femininity orientation prefer equality to allocate rewards. Employees with a collectivism orientation believe that all employees in an organisation are part of the same group (Dierdorff et al., 2011; House et al., 2004). The functioning of the group and the organisation is the priority for these employees. To guarantee effective functioning and harmony among employees, employees with a collectivism orientation are likely to prefer that every employee will be rewarded in the same way (Bolino & Turnley, 2008). Equality, as the allocation rule, is likely to strengthen

group identification and improve relationships among coworkers, which are often highly valued by employees with a collectivism orientation (Leung, 2005). Equality should be therefore the preferred allocation rule. Our theoretical prediction is in line with prior research, which suggests that employees from collectivistic cultures tend to prefer equality as the allocation rule (e.g., Leung, 2005; Leung & Stephan, 2001; Olsen, 2015; Taras & Rowney, 2008).

Hypothesis 3a *Employees with high collectivism scores prefer that rewards are allocated equally.*

Similarly, we expect that employees with a femininity orientation value equal allocations of rewards. Employees with a femininity orientation are considered to significantly care about the quality of interpersonal relationships and harmony among employees (Ellemers, 2018; Hofstede et al., 2010). Instead of being motivated by instrumental outcomes, employees with a femininity orientation are often motivated by the quality of life and harmonious relationships with coworkers (Avsec, 2003; Vitell et al., 2003). They may prefer cooperation and teamwork in the workplace instead of competition. Employees with feminine values often develop friendships at work that translate into their personal life outside work hours. To develop a work environment that is characterised by these attributes, it seems to be beneficial to establish equality as the allocation rule (Beugré, 2007). Equality as the allocation rule indicates to the workforce that employees are equal, and that cooperation and social cohesion are important in the workplace.

Hypothesis 3b *Employees with high femininity scores prefer that rewards are allocated equally.*

We further expect a positive relationship that employees with a low score on power distance will support an equal allocation of rewards. Employees low in power distance often do not tolerate power and status differences (House et al., 2004; Kirkman et al., 2009; Travaglino & Moon, 2020). They tend to reject hierarchy and authority (Anand et al., 2018; Daniels & Greguras, 2014), preferring a workplace where employees are equal and equally rewarded, independent of any status and power (Beugré, 2007; Leung, 2005). Our theorising is in line with the work of Fischer and Smith (2003), who concluded that people low in power distance tend to value the equality rule to allocate outcomes.

Hypothesis 3c *Employees with low power distance scores prefer that rewards are allocated equally.*

4.4 | Culture-inspired personal values and status

We expect that status-based allocations are valued by employees with a power distance orientation and a masculinity orientation. Prior research suggests that rewards could be allocated based on an employee's status and position in the organizational hierarchy in high power distance and masculine cultures (Bolino & Turnley, 2008; Earley, 1999; Fisek & Hysom, 2008; Rowley et al., 2004). Employees with a power distance orientation are considered to accept and tolerate status and power differences in the workplace (Carl et al., 2004; House et al., 2004). Power and status differences between management and employees are often not challenged by employees with a high power distance orientation (Daniels & Greguras, 2014; Maznevski et al., 2002). For this reason, it can be expected that employees with a power distance orientation prefer allocations based on status (Beugré, 2007).

Hypothesis 4a *Power distance predicts a higher support for the status rule.*

Employees with a masculinity orientation are likely to favour status-based allocations of outcomes because these employees are considered to value status symbols to measure their achievement and performance (Hofstede et al., 2010). They tend to be motivated by achievement, prestige, and status (Vitell et al., 2003). It would therefore make sense to assume that they prefer that supervisors distribute outcomes based on an employee's status. This means employees with the highest status should receive more favourable outcomes.

Hypothesis 4b *Masculinity predicts a higher support for the status rule.*

4.5 | Culture-inspired personal values and need

A preference for the need rule implies that outcomes should be distributed to employees who have the greatest need (Beugré, 2007; Deutsch, 1975, 1985; Leung, 2005). Previous research suggests that the need rule can be salient in organisations and cultures that put a high value on the individual's well-being (Beugré, 2007; Leung, 2005; Leung & Tong, 2004) or those that focus on social programs (Steiner, 2001). A focus on the individual's well-being is often triggered through a scarcity of resources in the respective cultural context (Leung, 1988). Past research found that employees in India (Berman et al., 1985) and Indonesia (Murphy-Berman & Berman, 2002) tend to value need as allocation rule. We suggest that employees with a collectivism orientation and employees with a femininity orientation accept the need rule as allocation rule. Employees with collectivism and femininity orientations are considered to value social cohesion and to be concerned about the well-being of the group (Dierdorff et al., 2011; Jackson et al., 2006). By applying the need rule as the allocation rule, harmonious relationships and employee well-being would be favoured when compared to competition and individual recognition (Leung, 2005; Leung & Tong, 2004). Therefore, employees with collectivism and femininity orientations may consider need as a possible allocation rule.

Hypothesis 5a *Collectivism predicts a higher support for the need rule.*

Hypothesis 5b *Femininity predicts a higher support for the need rule.*

5 | DATA AND METHODS

5.1 | Sample and data collection procedures

We conducted a two-wave online survey study with employees in 28 countries to generalise our findings across cultures and to guarantee enough variance of culture-inspired personal values and preferences for allocation rules. The employees worked in different organisations from different industries. A total of 6943 employees participated in the first survey. Of these 6943 employees, 3432 employees completed the second survey, leading to a response rate of 49%. The countries and the number of employees per country are listed in the Appendix. We selected the countries based on the GLOBE study which identified 10 different cultural clusters (House et al., 2004). Our goal was to have at least two countries from every cultural cluster to generalise our findings across cultures. Most employees lived in Portugal (6%), Spain (6%), Argentina (5%), Belgium (5%), Hong Kong (5%), Mexico (5%), Singapore (5%) (see Appendix for the number of respondents per country) Table A1.

Further, the majority of employees worked in education (11%), engineering (9%), retail (9%), production (8%), and finance/banking (7%) (see Table 1 for the other industries). In our study, 51% of the employees, who completed both

TABLE 1 Validation of measurement scales through CFA

T1 variables	χ^2	Df	CFI	TLI	RMSEA	SRMR
All countries	3348.97	588	0.94	0.93	0.037	0.042
English-speaking countries	1458.76	588	0.94	0.93	0.039	0.049
Spanish-speaking countries	1314.76	588	0.92	0.91	0.041	0.050
Chinese-speaking countries	960.96	588	0.92	0.91	0.041	0.057
Portuguese-speaking countries	873.40	588	0.93	0.92	0.040	0.056
German-speaking countries	918.74	588	0.91	0.90	0.045	0.061
French-speaking countries	914.57	588	0.93	0.93	0.038	0.057

Note: N = 3432.

surveys, were women. The average age of respondents was 43 years. Most participants had at least a high-school degree (98%). A high number of participants also had university degrees (65.4%).

With the help of two market research companies, the surveys were sent per email to employees who were interested in our study. The goal was to have a diverse sample from each country in terms of gender (60/40 ratio), age, occupations, and industry. The market research companies controlled the identity of the participants to avoid any false or double registrations. We further included test questions and screened out participants that did not respond correctly to these questions. An example is: 'This is a test to check if you read all the statements. Please respond with strongly disagree.' Culture-inspired personal values and demographic information were measured in Time 1, while allocation rule preferences were measured in Time 2. The second survey was sent to employees after around 4 months. This design reduces concerns about common method variance (Podsakoff et al., 2012).

5.2 | Measurement

The participants responded on a five-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). Professional translators translated the original scales, which were then back-translated and proofread by bi-lingual speakers (Brislin et al., 1973). If any discrepancies emerged, the translators discussed them with the first author and agreed on a definition (Sireci et al., 2006).

5.2.1 | Allocation rule preferences

We selected items of Cugueró-Escofet and Fortin (2022) and adapted the wording of several items. We used the following instruction: 'When the supervisor distributes outcomes (e.g., pay, bonus, promotion, performance evaluation, etc.), ...,' followed by the items. The three items for task-performance equity reflect the criteria quality, effectiveness, and productivity, which were often used by previous research to measure task performance (e.g., Ancona & Caldwell, 1992; Hempel et al., 2009; Van Der Vegt & Bunderson, 2005). The Cronbach alpha was 0.87. To measure extra-role performance-based equity, we selected three items to reflect work effort, loyalty, and relationships with coworkers that were included by prior research to measure extra-role performance (e.g., Befort & Hattrup, 2003; Lee & Allen, 2002; Van der Vegt et al., 2003; Welbourne et al., 1998). The alpha was 0.66. To measure a preference for equality, we selected three items to capture equal treatment, equal share, and equal distribution that were used by prior research (e.g., Berman et al., 1985; Fischer, 2004; Hui et al., 1991). The alpha was 0.78. To measure a preference for status, we selected three items that were similar to previous research (Conlon et al., 2004; Earley, 1999; Evans et al., 2010; Fischer, 2004; Fisek & Hysom, 2008; Rowley et al., 2004). Based on Early's work (1999), we further included one item to capture age: 4) '... preference should be given to those who are older.' The coefficient alpha was 0.86. To measure the need rule, we selected three items to reflect the three criteria need for individual well-being, experiencing difficulties, and need for personal development that were used by prior research (Deutsch, 1975, 1985; Fischer, 2004; Murphy-Berman & Berman, 2002). We adapted two items to emphasise 'individual well-being' and 'personal development.' The alpha was 0.93.

5.2.2 | Culture-inspired personal values

We used the items of Dorfman and Howell (1988). We used the items of Dorfman and Howell because they developed cultural value items at the individual level of analysis and their items are based on the original work of Hofstede (1984). Further, their scales have been often used by prior research to analyse cultural value orientations and employees' perceptions and attitudes (Taras et al., 2010). An example of collectivism-individualism is 'Group welfare is more

important than individual rewards.' The coefficient alpha was 0.70. An example of power distance is 'Managers should make most decisions without consulting subordinates.' The alpha was 0.71. An example of masculinity–femininity is 'It is preferable to have a man in high level position rather than a woman.' The alpha was 0.81. 'Standard operating procedures are helpful to employees on the job' is one of the items to measure uncertainty avoidance. The alpha was 0.83.

5.2.3 | Control

We controlled for gender, age, educational level, industry, and country. We included gender, because prior research suggests that female and male employees may attach a different importance to reward allocations (Sweeney & McFarlin, 1998). Further, older employees may favour equality and need as allocation rules, because they tend to get more collectivistic (Steel & Taras, 2010). We further controlled for educational level, because higher educated employees could prefer task performance as allocation to rule to reward individual achievement and meritocracy. As employees worked in different jobs in different industries, we also controlled for industry. For reasons of completeness, we also controlled for Hofstede's fifth dimension long-term orientation that he added in a later study (Hofstede, 2001). To measure long-term orientation, we used three items that were developed by House et al. (2004) and adapted them to the individual level (e.g., I believe that people should live for the future). Finally, we controlled for an employee's country of residence, because the participants worked in 28 different countries.

6 | RESULTS

6.1 | Confirmatory factor analysis

The measurement model included nine latent variables: collectivism-individualism, power distance, uncertainty avoidance, masculinity-femininity, extra-role performance-based equity, task performance-based equity, equality, need, and status. The model provided a good fit to the data, $\chi^2(588) = 3348.97$; CFI = 0.94; TLI = 0.93; RMSEA = 0.037; SRMR = 0.042. We compared the original model with models that included a different number of allocation factors. First, we combined extra-role with task performance-based equity. The model fit got worse ($\Delta\chi^2[8] = 1219.33$, $p < 0.05$). Next, we combined need with equality. The model fit got worse ($\Delta\chi^2[8] = 2692.22$, $p < 0.05$). Finally, we combined all allocation factors to one overall allocation factor. Again, the model fit got worse ($\Delta\chi^2[26] = 11,085.91$, $p < 0.05$). We therefore kept the hypothesised model. We also conducted confirmatory factor analyses based on language. For all languages, the measurement model provided a good fit to the data (Table 1). We could not conduct a confirmatory factor analysis for each single country due to a small sample size in few countries.

6.2 | Descriptive statistics

Correlations, means, and standard deviations are presented in Table 2. We also calculated the means for the different countries (Appendix).

TABLE 2 Descriptive statistics, correlations, and Cronbach alphas

	Mean	SD	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16
1. Gender (0 = male, 1 = female)	0.51	0.50																
2. Age	43.03	11.55	-0.10**															
3. Long-term orientation	3.71	0.71	-0.12**	-0.07**	(0.70)													
4. Collectivism-individualism	3.26	0.79	-0.11**	-0.11**	0.16**	(0.70)												
5. Power distance	2.50	0.70	-0.11**	-0.03	0.17**	0.09**	(0.71)											
6. Masculinity-femininity	2.35	0.84	-0.21**	-0.01	0.23**	0.12**	0.35**	(0.81)										
7. Uncertainty avoidance	4.25	0.53	-0.01	-0.03	0.37**	0.17**	0.12**	0.04*	(0.83)									
8. Extra-role performance equity	3.71	0.71	-0.05**	-0.07**	0.18**	0.18**	0.14**	0.14**	0.24**	(0.66)								
9. Task performance equity	4.38	0.71	-0.00	-0.03	0.13**	0.02	0.06**	-0.01	0.19**	0.43**	(0.87)							
10. Need	2.77	0.85	-0.05**	-0.06**	0.07**	0.11**	0.10**	0.13**	0.01	0.29**	0.09**	(0.81)						
11. Equality	3.99	0.86	0.02	-0.05**	0.04*	0.10**	-0.04*	-0.09**	0.07**	0.04*	-0.01	0.20**	(0.76)					
12. Status	2.77	0.85	-0.05**	-0.03	0.10**	0.09**	0.21**	0.21**	0.05**	0.26**	0.01	0.40**	0.09**	(0.80)				
13. Engineering	0.09	0.29	-0.15**	-0.06**	0.03	0.05**	0.06**	0.05**	0.01	0.02	0.03	0.02	-0.01	-0.01				
14. Production	0.08	0.26	-0.05**	0.00	0.00	0.03	0.03	0.01	0.02	-0.02	0.00	0.02	0.02	0.02	-0.09**			
15. Finance/Banking	0.07	0.26	0.04*	-0.05**	0.03*	0.01	0.01	0.00	0.01	0.00	0.04*	-0.01	-0.01	-0.02	-0.09**	-0.08**		
16. Human resource management	0.04	0.20	0.05**	-0.04*	0.03	0.02	0.04*	0.035*	0.02	0.02	0.02	-0.02	0.02	0.00	-0.07**	-0.06**	-0.06**	
17. Marketing	0.03	0.18	0.03	-0.04*	0.02	0.02	-0.01	0.01	0.02	0.06**	0.02	0.00	0.01	0.00	-0.06**	-0.05**	-0.05**	-0.04*
18. Planning	0.02	0.13	-0.01	0.00	0.03	0.05**	-0.01	0.00	0.05**	-0.01	0.00	0.01	0.01	-0.01	-0.04*	-0.04*	-0.04*	-0.03
19. Research and development	0.02	0.15	-0.03	-0.02	0.01	0.02	-0.01	0.00	-0.03	0.00	0.01	-0.02	-0.04*	-0.02	-0.05**	-0.04*	-0.04*	-0.03
20. Education	0.11	0.31	0.07**	0.01	-0.01	0.01	-0.07**	-0.04*	-0.02	0.01	-0.02	0.02	0.02	0.00	-0.11**	-0.10**	-0.10**	-0.07**
21. Support services (for example, plant and equipment maintenance)	0.04	0.20	-0.08**	0.02	0.01	0.03	0.03	0.06**	0.00	-0.02	-0.02	-0.02	-0.02	0.03	-0.07**	-0.06**	-0.06**	-0.04*

TABLE 2 (Continued)

	Mean	SD	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16
22. Government institution/Political party	0.05	0.22	-0.05**	0.03	-0.02	-0.04*	-0.01	0.02	0.00	-0.04*	0.01	-0.01	0.01	-0.04*	-0.08**	-0.07**	-0.07**	-0.05**
23. Transportation	0.04	0.19	-0.08**	0.03	0.04*	-0.03	0.06**	0.04*	0.02	0.03	-0.01	0.04*	0.00	0.05**	-0.06**	-0.06**	-0.06**	-0.04*
24. Law	0.02	0.14	0.03	0.00	0.02	-0.03	0.00	-0.02	0.02	-0.02	0.02	-0.04*	-0.04*	0.02	-0.05**	-0.04*	-0.04*	-0.03
25. Postal	0.01	0.08	-0.01	0.02	0.00	0.01	-0.03	0.02	-0.02	-0.01	0.01	-0.01	-0.01	0.00	-0.03	-0.02	-0.02	-0.02
26. Telecommunications	0.02	0.15	-0.05**	-0.04*	0.00	0.00	-0.02	-0.01	-0.01	0.01	0.02	-0.01	-0.01	-0.03	-0.05**	-0.05**	-0.05**	-0.03
27. Retail	0.09	0.29	0.08**	0.01	-0.01	-0.04*	0.03	0.00	0.03	0.02	-0.01	0.04*	0.00	0.03	-0.10**	-0.09**	-0.09**	-0.07**
28. Insurance	0.01	0.11	0.00	0.02	0.00	0.02	0.00	0.01	-0.01	-0.03	0.00	-0.03	0.00	-0.01	-0.04*	-0.03	-0.03	-0.02
29. Social services	0.04	0.19	0.06**	0.02	0.01	-0.04*	-0.01	0.02	-0.03	-0.01	-0.03	0.00	-0.01	0.02	-0.06**	-0.06**	-0.06**	-0.04*
30. Health care	0.07	0.26	0.08**	0.01	-0.05**	0.01	-0.07**	0.03	-0.07**	0.03	-0.02	-0.08**	-0.02	0.01	-0.09**	-0.08**	-0.08**	-0.06**
31. Culture/Art	0.02	0.15	0.03	0.02	-0.04*	-0.03	-0.02	-0.03	-0.04*	-0.01	0.01	-0.02	0.04*	-0.01	-0.05**	-0.04*	-0.04*	-0.03
32. Television/Film	0.00	0.07	0.00	-0.01	-0.05**	-0.01	-0.04*	-0.05**	-0.05**	-0.02	-0.03	-0.02	0.02	-0.01	-0.02	-0.02	-0.02	-0.01
33. Scientific research	0.01	0.09	0.02	-0.03	-0.01	-0.01	-0.02	-0.01	-0.01	-0.03	0.01	-0.02	0.00	-0.05**	-0.03	-0.03	-0.03	-0.02
34. Other	0.11	0.31	0.01	0.07**	-0.04*	-0.04*	0.00	-0.04*	-0.04*	0.00	0.00	-0.01	-0.01	0.00	-0.11**	-0.10**	-0.10**	-0.07**
35. Argentina	0.05	0.21	-0.01	0.02	-0.09**	-0.13**	0.08**	-0.04*	-0.04*	0.04*	0.05**	0.03	-0.03	0.03	-0.02	0.00	0.00	-0.02
36. Australia	0.04	0.20	-0.01	0.19**	0.06**	-0.18**	0.02	-0.01	0.04*	-0.01	0.00	-0.05**	-0.04*	-0.03*	-0.03	-0.03	-0.01	-0.03
37. Austria	0.04	0.20	-0.01	0.00	-0.12**	-0.07**	-0.04*	-0.04*	-0.04*	-0.15**	-0.13**	-0.03	-0.09**	-0.01	-0.04*	0.00	-0.01	-0.01
38. Belgium	0.05	0.21	-0.01	0.07**	-0.11**	-0.13**	-0.03	-0.04*	-0.11**	-0.08**	-0.07**	-0.01	-0.05**	0.03	-0.06**	-0.01	-0.01	0.00
39. Brazil	0.02	0.15	0.02	-0.01	0.04*	0.07**	-0.04*	-0.034	0.08**	0.10**	0.01	-0.05**	0.05**	0.01	-0.01	-0.02	0.01	-0.02
40. Canada	0.04	0.20	-0.03	0.09**	0.02	-0.17**	0.01	-0.04*	0.03	-0.04*	-0.03	-0.02	-0.01	0.04*	-0.03*	-0.01	-0.04*	-0.02
41. Chile	0.03	0.16	0.04*	-0.04*	-0.04*	0.03	0.02	-0.06**	0.02	0.03	0.04*	0.04*	0.04*	0.01	0.03*	-0.01	0.07**	-0.02
42. China	0.02	0.15	0.02	-0.10**	0.07**	0.09**	0.06**	0.17**	0.01	0.07**	0.00	0.06**	0.00	0.07**	-0.01	0.01	0.02	0.03
43. Columbia	0.03	0.17	-0.06**	-0.07**	-0.03	0.02	0.05**	-0.06**	0.06**	0.03	0.04*	0.00	0.04*	-0.05**	0.03	-0.02	-0.02	0.05**
44. Croatia	0.03	0.18	0.03	0.01	0.04*	0.00	-0.06**	0.02	-0.05**	-0.12**	0.05**	0.01	-0.04*	-0.08**	-0.01	0.09**	-0.01	-0.04*
45. Finland	0.03	0.17	0.01	0.06**	-0.03	0.03	-0.14**	0.00	-0.03*	-0.02	-0.13**	-0.03*	0.01	0.04*	-0.02	0.04*	-0.02	0.01

(Continues)

TABLE 2 (Continued)

	Mean	SD	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16
46. France	0.04	0.19	0.04*	0.03	-0.12**	0.00	-0.05**	-0.10**	-0.10**	-0.04*	-0.03	0.02	-0.02	0.00	0.00	-0.02	0.00	0.00
47. Germany	0.04	0.20	0.04*	0.06**	-0.07**	-0.03	-0.05**	-0.06**	-0.17**	-0.19**	-0.07**	-0.11**	0.01	0.00	-0.02	0.01	-0.01	-0.03
48. Hong Kong	0.05	0.22	0.03	-0.08**	0.09**	0.05**	0.02	0.19**	-0.03	0.02	-0.05**	0.02	-0.04*	0.01	0.00	-0.03	0.00	0.05**
49. India	0.02	0.15	0.01	-0.10**	0.05**	0.14**	0.13**	0.041*	0.06**	0.10**	0.05**	0.06**	0.01	0.05**	0.07**	0.01	0.01	0.040*
50. Ireland	0.04	0.20	0.04*	0.04*	0.02	0.02	0.04*	-0.02	0.05**	0.01	0.02	0.03	0.02	-0.03	-0.02	-0.03	0.00	-0.03
51. Mexico	0.05	0.22	-0.18*	-0.02	0.02	0.08**	0.11**	0.00	0.06**	0.04*	0.08**	0.09**	0.07**	0.05**	0.05**	0.01	-0.02	0.01
52. Nigeria	0.02	0.15	-0.05*	-0.13**	0.15**	0.13**	0.05**	0.07**	0.15**	0.12**	0.06**	0.01	-0.07**	0.01	0.04*	-0.02	0.04*	0.02
53. Poland	0.02	0.14	0.02	0.03	0.08**	0.01	-0.01	0.08**	0.08**	0.07**	0.02	-0.03	-0.09**	0.02	-0.02	0.02	0.02	-0.01
54. Portugal	0.06	0.24	0.04	-0.08**	0.02	0.01	-0.12**	-0.11**	0.10**	0.07**	0.02	-0.04*	0.11**	-0.09**	0.02	-0.01	-0.01	0.03*
55. Singapore	0.05	0.22	-0.04	-0.01	0.07**	-0.13**	0.04*	0.18**	-0.05**	-0.03	0.01	0.03	-0.04*	-0.02	0.08**	-0.04*	0.04*	0.04*
56. South Africa	0.03	0.17	0.02	0.01	0.08**	-0.02	0.03	-0.02	0.09**	0.04*	0.06**	-0.01	-0.03	-0.03	-0.02	-0.03	0.03	0.00
57. Spain	0.06	0.23	0.00	-0.01	-0.10**	0.09**	0.03	-0.11**	-0.04*	-0.02	-0.01	0.03	0.04*	-0.05**	-0.02	0.09**	0.00	0.00
58. Switzerland	0.03	0.17	0.01	0.07**	-0.14**	0.04*	-0.04*	-0.05**	-0.10**	-0.02	-0.03	-0.01	-0.03	0.02	-0.02	-0.02	-0.01	-0.02
59. Taiwan	0.03	0.18	0.04*	-0.10**	0.06**	0.08**	-0.04*	0.09**	0.02	0.08**	0.02	0.09**	0.03	0.03	0.01	0.03	0.00	-0.01
60. Turkey	0.03	0.16	0.03	-0.09**	0.05**	0.11**	-0.02	0.05**	0.07**	0.02	-0.09**	-0.03	0.04*	0.10**	0.04*	0.02	-0.04*	-0.02
61. UK	0.03	0.16	-0.01	0.08**	0.01	0.02	-0.03	-0.03	0.03	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	0.01	-0.03	0.01	-0.01	-0.02	-0.02
62. USA	0.01	0.09	0.03	0.09**	0.02	0.00	-0.03	-0.04*	0.01	0.00	0.03	-0.04*	-0.07**	-0.01	-0.03	-0.03	-0.02	-0.02
Mean SD	0.03	0.18																
17. Marketing	0.03	0.18																
18. Planning	0.02	0.13	-0.02															
19. Research and development	0.02	0.15	-0.03	-0.02														
20. Education	0.11	0.31	-0.06**	-0.04*	-0.05**													
21. Support services (for example, plant and equipment maintenance)	0.04	0.20	-0.04*	-0.03	-0.03	-0.07**												

TABLE 2 (Continued)

	Mean	SD	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32
22. Government institution/Political party	0.05	0.22	-0.04*	-0.03	-0.04*	-0.08**	-0.05**											
23. Transportation	0.04	0.19	-0.04*	-0.03	-0.03	-0.07**	-0.04*	-0.05**										
24. Law	0.02	0.14	-0.03	-0.02	-0.02	-0.05**	-0.03	-0.03*	-0.03									
25. Postal	0.01	0.08	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.03	-0.02	-0.02	-0.02	-0.01								
26. Telecommunications	0.02	0.15	-0.03	-0.02	-0.02	-0.05**	-0.03	-0.04*	-0.03	-0.02	-0.01							
27. Retail	0.09	0.29	-0.06**	-0.04*	-0.05**	-0.11**	-0.07**	-0.08**	-0.06**	-0.05**	-0.03	-0.05**						
28. Insurance	0.01	0.11	-0.02	-0.01	-0.02	-0.04*	-0.02	-0.03	-0.02	-0.02	-0.01	-0.02	-0.04*					
29. Social services	0.04	0.19	-0.04*	-0.03	-0.03	-0.07**	-0.04*	-0.05**	-0.04*	-0.03	-0.02	-0.03	-0.06**	-0.02				
30. Health care	0.07	0.26	-0.05**	-0.04*	-0.04*	-0.10**	-0.06**	-0.07**	-0.06**	-0.04*	-0.02	-0.04*	-0.09**	-0.03	-0.06**			
31. Culture/Art	0.02	0.15	-0.03	-0.02	-0.02	-0.05**	-0.03	-0.04*	-0.03	-0.02	-0.01	-0.02	-0.05**	-0.02	-0.03	-0.04*		
32. Television/Film	0.00	0.07	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.02	-0.01	-0.02	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.02	-0.01	-0.01	-0.02	-0.01	
33. Scientific research	0.01	0.09	-0.02	-0.01	-0.01	-0.03	-0.02	-0.02	-0.02	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.03	-0.01	-0.02	-0.03	-0.01	-0.01
34. Other	0.11	0.31	-0.06**	-0.04**	-0.05**	-0.12**	-0.07**	-0.08**	-0.07**	-0.05**	-0.03	-0.06**	-0.11**	-0.04*	-0.07**	-0.10**	-0.05**	-0.02
35. Argentina	0.05	0.21	-0.03	0.00	-0.01	0.03	0.00	0.01	0.02	0.05**	-0.02	0.02	-0.02	-0.01	-0.01	-0.02	0.00	-0.02
36. Australia	0.04	0.20	-0.02	0.00	0.00	-0.02	0.01	0.03	0.02	0.00	0.00	-0.03*	-0.01	0.00	0.01	0.05**	0.02	0.01
37. Austria	0.04	0.20	-0.01	-0.02	0.01	0.01	0.00	-0.03	-0.02	0.02	-0.02	-0.01	-0.02	0.06**	0.03	0.04*	0.02	0.03
38. Belgium	0.05	0.21	-0.04*	-0.02	0.00	0.02	-0.01	0.07**	0.00	-0.01	0.05**	0.01	-0.03	0.02	-0.01	0.01	0.02	0.02
39. Brazil	0.02	0.15	-0.03	0.04*	-0.01	0.00	0.02	0.00	-0.01	0.02	-0.01	0.00	0.04*	0.00	-0.02	0.01	0.03	0.02
40. Canada	0.04	0.20	0.00	-0.01	-0.01	0.00	-0.01	0.02	0.05**	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.05**	0.00	0.01	0.00	-0.03	-0.01
41. Chile	0.03	0.16	0.01	0.01	0.02	-0.02	-0.01	-0.02	0.00	-0.02	-0.01	0.01	-0.03	0.00	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01
42. China	0.02	0.15	0.03	0.01	0.05**	0.00	-0.02	0.04*	0.00	-0.02	-0.01	-0.03	0.00	-0.02	0.01	-0.02	-0.01	-0.01
43. Columbia	0.03	0.17	0.05**	0.01	0.00	-0.02	-0.01	-0.03	0.01	0.04*	-0.01	0.01	-0.01	-0.02	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.01
44. Croatia	0.03	0.18	0.00	-0.02	0.00	0.00	0.02	0.02	-0.01	-0.03	0.01	-0.01	-0.01	0.04*	0.00	-0.02	-0.01	-0.01
45. Finland	0.03	0.17	-0.02	0.00	0.00	-0.04*	0.01	-0.03*	-0.01	-0.01	0.03	0.04*	0.01	0.00	0.06**	0.02	0.05**	0.01

(Continues)

TABLE 2 (Continued)

	Mean	SD	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32
46. France	0.04	0.19	0.00	-0.03	-0.02	0.02	-0.02	0.01	0.01	-0.03	0.02	-0.01	0.01	-0.02	0.02	0.01	-0.01	0.01
47. Germany	0.04	0.20	-0.02	-0.01	0.02	-0.05**	0.00	-0.02	-0.01	0.04**	0.04*	0.02	0.01	-0.01	0.01	0.03*	0.04*	0.01
48. Hong Kong	0.05	0.22	0.06**	-0.01	-0.01	0.00	0.04*	0.02	0.03	-0.01	0.01	-0.03	-0.01	-0.03	0.05**	-0.01	-0.04*	-0.02
49. India	0.02	0.15	0.01	0.01	0.02	0.01	-0.01	-0.03	-0.02	-0.02	-0.01	0.01	-0.03	0.00	-0.02	-0.03	-0.02	-0.01
50. Ireland	0.04	0.20	-0.01	-0.03	-0.02	0.01	0.01	-0.02	-0.01	0.01	-0.02	0.01	0.02	0.00	0.00	0.04*	0.01	0.01
51. Mexico	0.05	0.22	0.01	0.04*	-0.01	0.00	0.00	0.01	-0.03	0.00	-0.02	0.01	0.00	-0.01	-0.04*	-0.04*	0.00	-0.02
52. Nigeria	0.02	0.15	0.02	0.00	0.01	-0.01	0.00	0.01	-0.02	-0.01	-0.01	0.04*	-0.03	0.02	0.02	-0.03	-0.01	-0.01
53. Poland	0.02	0.14	-0.03	-0.02	-0.01	0.01	-0.02	0.00	0.02	-0.01	-0.01	0.03	0.02	0.02	0.00	-0.03	0.00	-0.01
54. Portugal	0.06	0.24	-0.02	0.01	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	-0.03	0.00	0.01	-0.02	0.03	-0.01	-0.02	0.02	-0.01	0.02
55. Singapore	0.05	0.22	0.00	0.00	-0.01	0.00	-0.01	-0.02	0.01	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.02	0.00	-0.02	-0.04*	-0.03*	-0.02
56. South Africa	0.03	0.17	0.01	-0.01	-0.01	0.00	-0.01	0.00	0.04*	0.01	-0.01	0.02	0.01	0.00	-0.02	-0.03	-0.03	-0.01
57. Spain	0.06	0.23	-0.02	0.01	-0.03	0.00	0.00	-0.01	0.02	0.00	-0.02	-0.02	0.00	-0.02	-0.03*	-0.01	0.01	-0.02
58. Switzerland	0.03	0.17	-0.01	-0.02	0.01	0.02	0.00	-0.02	-0.01	-0.01	0.01	-0.01	-0.01	0.03	0.00	0.02	0.00	0.01
59. Taiwan	0.03	0.18	0.08**	0.04*	0.07**	-0.03	-0.01	-0.02	-0.01	-0.03	0.02	-0.03	0.00	-0.02	0.02	-0.03	0.04*	-0.01
60. Turkey	0.03	0.16	0.01	0.01	-0.02	0.02	0.00	0.02	-0.03	0.00	-0.01	0.01	-0.05**	0.00	-0.01	0.03	0.01	0.02
61. UK	0.03	0.16	-0.02	0.01	0.00	0.03	0.00	0.00	0.00	-0.01	-0.01	0.00	0.01	0.00	-0.02	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01
62. USA	0.01	0.09	0.02	-0.01	-0.01	0.03	0.01	-0.01	-0.02	0.01	-0.01	0.00	0.02	-0.01	0.01	0.02	-0.01	0.04*
Mean	SD	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	
33. Scientific research	0.01	0.09																
34. Other	0.11	0.31	-0.03															
35. Argentina	0.05	0.21	-0.02	0.02														
36. Australia	0.04	0.20	0.00	0.04**	-0.05**													
37. Austria	0.04	0.20	0.03	0.00	-0.05**	-0.04**												
38. Belgium	0.05	0.21	-0.02	0.03	-0.05**	-0.05**												
39. Brazil	0.02	0.15	-0.01	-0.01	-0.04*	-0.03	-0.04*											
40. Canada	0.04	0.20	0.01	0.02	-0.05**	-0.04*	-0.05**	-0.03										

TABLE 2 (Continued)

	Mean	SD	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48
41. Chile	0.03	0.16	0.00	0.00	-0.04*	-0.04*	-0.04*	-0.04*	-0.03	-0.03	-0.03	-0.03	-0.03	-0.03	-0.03	-0.03	-0.03	-0.03
42. China	0.02	0.15	0.01	-0.04*	-0.04*	-0.03	-0.03	-0.04*	-0.02	-0.03	-0.03	-0.03	-0.03	-0.03	-0.03	-0.03	-0.03	-0.03
43. Columbia	0.03	0.17	0.00	-0.01	-0.04*	-0.04*	-0.04*	-0.04*	-0.03	-0.04*	-0.03	-0.03	-0.03	-0.04*	-0.04*	-0.04*	-0.04*	-0.04*
44. Croatia	0.03	0.18	0.02	-0.02	-0.04*	-0.04*	-0.04*	-0.04*	-0.03	-0.04*	-0.03	-0.03	-0.03	-0.03	-0.03	-0.03	-0.03	-0.03
45. Finland	0.03	0.17	-0.02	-0.02	-0.04*	-0.04*	-0.04*	-0.04*	-0.03	-0.04*	-0.03	-0.03	-0.03	-0.03	-0.03	-0.03	-0.03	-0.03
46. France	0.04	0.19	-0.02	0.01	-0.04*	-0.04*	-0.04*	-0.04*	-0.03	-0.04*	-0.03	-0.03	-0.03	-0.04*	-0.04*	-0.04*	-0.04*	-0.04*
47. Germany	0.04	0.20	0.01	0.02	-0.05**	-0.04*	-0.04*	-0.05**	-0.03	-0.04*	-0.03	-0.03	-0.04*	-0.04*	-0.04*	-0.04*	-0.04*	-0.04*
48. Hong Kong	0.05	0.22	-0.02	-0.06**	-0.05**	-0.05**	-0.05**	-0.05**	-0.04*	-0.05**	-0.04*	-0.04*	-0.04*	-0.04*	-0.04*	-0.05**	-0.05**	-0.05**
49. India	0.02	0.15	0.01	-0.01	-0.04*	-0.03*	-0.03	-0.04*	-0.02	-0.03	-0.03	-0.03	-0.03	-0.03	-0.03	-0.03	-0.03	-0.04*
50. Ireland	0.04	0.20	0.00	0.03	-0.05**	-0.04**	-0.04*	-0.05**	-0.03	-0.04*	-0.03*	-0.03	-0.04*	-0.04*	-0.04*	-0.04*	-0.04*	-0.05**
51. Mexico	0.05	0.22	-0.01	0.01	-0.05**	-0.05**	-0.05**	-0.05**	-0.04*	-0.05**	-0.04*	-0.04*	-0.04*	-0.04*	-0.04*	-0.05**	-0.05**	-0.05**
52. Nigeria	0.02	0.15	0.01	-0.04*	-0.03	-0.03	-0.03	-0.03	-0.02	-0.03	-0.02	-0.02	-0.03	-0.03	-0.03	-0.03	-0.03	-0.04*
53. Poland	0.02	0.14	-0.01	-0.01	-0.03	-0.03	-0.03	-0.03	-0.02	-0.03	-0.02	-0.02	-0.03	-0.03	-0.03	-0.03	-0.03	-0.03*
54. Portugal	0.06	0.24	0.01	-0.02	-0.06**	-0.06**	-0.05**	-0.06**	-0.04*	-0.05**	-0.04*	-0.04*	-0.04**	-0.05**	-0.05**	-0.05**	-0.05**	-0.06**
55. Singapore	0.05	0.22	0.02	-0.04*	-0.05**	-0.05**	-0.05**	-0.05**	-0.04*	-0.05**	-0.04*	-0.04*	-0.04*	-0.04*	-0.04*	-0.04**	-0.05**	-0.05**
56. South Africa	0.03	0.17	-0.02	0.03	-0.04*	-0.04*	-0.04*	-0.04*	-0.03	-0.04*	-0.03	-0.03	-0.03	-0.03	-0.03	-0.03	-0.04*	-0.04*
57. Spain	0.06	0.23	0.02	0.00	-0.05**	-0.05**	-0.05**	-0.05**	-0.04*	-0.05**	-0.04*	-0.04*	-0.04*	-0.04**	-0.04*	-0.05**	-0.05**	-0.06**
58. Switzerland	0.03	0.17	0.02	0.06**	-0.04*	-0.04*	-0.04*	-0.04*	-0.03	-0.04*	-0.03	-0.03	-0.03	-0.03	-0.03	-0.03	-0.04*	-0.04*
59. Taiwan	0.03	0.18	0.00	-0.05**	-0.04*	-0.04*	-0.04*	-0.04*	-0.03	-0.04*	-0.03	-0.03	-0.03	-0.03*	-0.03*	-0.04*	-0.04*	-0.04**
60. Turkey	0.03	0.16	-0.02	0.00	-0.04*	-0.03*	-0.03*	-0.04*	-0.03	-0.03	-0.03	-0.03	-0.03	-0.03	-0.03	-0.03	-0.03	-0.04*
61. UK	0.03	0.16	0.00	0.03	-0.04*	-0.03*	-0.03*	-0.04*	-0.03	-0.03	-0.03	-0.03	-0.03	-0.03	-0.03	-0.03	-0.03	-0.04*
62. USA	0.01	0.09	-0.01	0.02	-0.02	-0.02	-0.02	-0.02	-0.01	-0.02	-0.02	-0.02	-0.02	-0.02	-0.02	-0.02	-0.02	-0.02
Mean	SD	49	50	51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60	61				
49. India	0.02	0.15																
50. Ireland	0.04	0.20	-0.03															
51. Mexico	0.05	0.22	-0.04*	-0.05**														

(Continues)

TABLE 2 (Continued)

	Mean	SD	49	50	51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60	61
52. Nigeria	0.02	0.15	-0.02	-0.03	-0.03*										
53. Poland	0.02	0.14	-0.02	-0.03	-0.03*	-0.02									
54. Portugal	0.06	0.24	-0.04*	-0.05**	-0.06**	-0.04*	-0.04*								
55. Singapore	0.05	0.22	-0.04*	-0.05**	-0.05**	-0.03*	-0.03*	-0.06**							
56. South Africa	0.03	0.17	-0.03	-0.04*	-0.04*	-0.03	-0.02	-0.04*	-0.04*						
57. Spain	0.06	0.23	-0.04*	-0.05**	-0.06**	-0.04*	-0.04*	-0.06**	-0.06**	-0.04*					
58. Switzerland	0.03	0.17	-0.03	-0.04*	-0.04*	-0.03	-0.03	-0.05**	-0.04*	-0.03	-0.04*				
59. Taiwan	0.03	0.18	-0.03	-0.04*	-0.04*	-0.03	-0.03	-0.05**	-0.04*	-0.03	-0.05**	-0.03			
60. Turkey	0.03	0.16	-0.03	-0.03*	-0.04*	-0.02	-0.02	-0.04*	-0.04*	-0.03	-0.04*	-0.03	-0.03		
61. UK	0.03	0.16	-0.03	-0.03	-0.04*	-0.02	-0.02	-0.04*	-0.04*	-0.03	-0.04*	-0.03	-0.03	-0.03	
62. USA	0.01	0.09	-0.02	-0.02	-0.02	-0.01	-0.01	-0.02	-0.02	-0.02	-0.02	-0.02	-0.02	-0.02	-0.02

Note: N = 3432. Reliabilities (coefficient alphas) appear in parentheses on the diagonal.

** $d < 0.01$; * $d < 0.05$.

6.3 | Hypothesis testing

To test our hypotheses, we conducted a multilevel path analysis (Table 3) using Mplus version 8.3, because participants were nested in countries. Using Mplus allowed to test include all cultural value dimensions and preferences for allocation rules in the same model. The results are presented in Table 3.

Hypothesis 1 is partially supported by the results, because employees with high individualism ($\beta = -.06, p < .01$) and uncertainty avoidance scores ($\beta = .10, p < .01$) tend to prefer task performance-based equity allocations. However, masculinity did not have a significant effect ($\beta = -.04, p = .161$).

Hypothesis 2 is supported, because employees with high collectivism ($\beta = .06, p < .05$) and power distance scores ($\beta = .05, p < .01$) prefer extra-role performance-based equity.

Hypothesis 3 is supported by the results, because employees with high collectivism ($\beta = .08, p < .01$) or femininity scores ($\beta = -.08, p < .01$) or low power distance scores ($\beta = -.04, p < .01$) tend to prefer equality-based allocations.

Hypothesis 4 is supported by the results, as employees with high power distance ($\beta = .14, p < .01$) or masculinity scores ($\beta = .12, p < .01$) prefer the status rule.

Finally, *Hypothesis 5* predicted that employees with high collectivism or femininity scores prefer need-based allocations. This hypothesis is partially supported. Employees with high collectivism scores ($\beta = 0.08, p < 0.001$) tend to prefer need. However, not femininity but masculinity was positively related to need-based allocations scores ($\beta = 0.08, p < 0.01$).

7 | DISCUSSION

Adopting the approach of previous international HRM research (Farndale et al., 2020; Park & Nawakitphaitoon, 2018; Peretz et al., 2018), we drew on Hofstede's cross-cultural management framework to explain how employees' value orientations influence the way in which they experience reward allocations. We developed a theoretically informed model specifying how culture-inspired personal values influence employees' preferences for reward allocation rules. We further provided empirical evidence for the relationship between value orientations and reward allocation rules in a rigorous way. The results indicate that value orientations explain employees' preferences for allocation rules beyond demographic characteristics, educational level, industry, and country. Through our findings, we make several contributions that expand cross-cultural research on reward allocation rules.

7.1 | Theoretical contributions

We contribute to an ongoing debate within international HRM research that refers to whether multinational organisations should adapt their reward management practices across cultures (Adamovic, 2018, 2022; Bartram et al., 2015; Caprar et al., 2022; Farndale et al., 2020; Ferner & Almond, 2012; Gooderham et al., 2018). Theoretically, our findings provide support for a contingency perspective (e.g., Park & Nawakitphaitoon, 2018; Peretz et al., 2018; Stavrou et al., 2015) than for a universalistic perspective (e.g., Caprar et al., 2022), because employees' preferences for reward allocation rules depend on their value orientations. The results support the majority of hypotheses and suggest that it would be beneficial for multinational organisations to conduct a cross-cultural adaptation for reward management practices based on their employees' value orientations. Managers need to pay attention that their allocation of outcomes matches their employees' cultural value orientations and their preferences for allocation rules. Such cultural match is likely to increase employees' satisfaction with outcomes and perceptions of fairness. In contrast,

TABLE 3 Results of multilevel path analysis

	Extra-role performance equity	Task performance equity	Need	Equality	Status
Gender (0 = male, 1 = female)	-0.05*	-0.01	-0.01	0.01	-0.03
Age	-0.05*	-0.04	-0.04	-0.04*	-0.05**
Long-term orientation	0.04	0.06*	0.06*	0.06**	0.04*
Education (compared to 'no education')					
High-school degree	-0.34**	-0.17	-0.12*	-0.15*	-0.21*
Bachelor's degree	-0.35**	-0.17	-0.17*	-0.28**	-0.26**
Master's degree	-0.30**	-0.12	-0.15**	-0.22**	-0.21**
PhD degree	-0.11**	-0.03	-0.07**	-0.11**	-0.08**
Industry (compared to 'Engineering')					
Production	-0.03	-0.04*	0.01	0.00	0.01
Finance/Banking	-0.02	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01
Human resource management	0.00	-0.01	-0.03	0.02	0.00
Marketing	0.05**	-0.02	-0.01	0.02	0.00
Planning	-0.04	-0.02	-0.00	-0.00	-0.01
Research and development	-0.01	-0.01	-0.02	-0.03	-0.02
Education	0.01	-0.06*	0.03	0.04	0.02
Support services (for example, plant and equipment maintenance)	-0.04	-0.05*	-0.02	-0.02	0.01
Government institution/Political party	-0.05*	-0.02	-0.00	0.02	-0.05
Transportation	0.01	-0.05	0.03	0.01	0.04*
Law	-0.02	-0.00	-0.02	-0.04*	0.03
Postal	0.00	0.02	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01
Telecommunications	0.00	0.00	-0.00	-0.01	-0.03
Retail	0.01	-0.05*	0.05	-0.01	0.03
Insurance	-0.02	-0.01	-0.02	0.01	-0.01
Social services	0.00	-0.05**	0.01	-0.00	0.02
Health care	-0.00	-0.10**	0.01	0.00	0.02
Culture/Art	-0.00	0.00	0.00	0.05*	-0.01
Television/Film	-0.01	-0.03	-0.01	0.02	-0.00
Scientific research	-0.02*	-0.01	-0.01	-0.00	-0.03
Other	0.01	-0.04	0.01	-0.01	0.01
Country (compared to UK)					
Argentina	0.16**	0.20**	0.21**	-0.04**	0.24**
Australia	0.03	0.03	-0.07**	-0.09**	0.01
Austria	-0.26**	0.01	-0.28**	0.00	0.01
Belgium	-0.14**	-0.23**	0.06	-0.15**	0.28**
Brazil	0.38**	0.06**	-0.21**	0.19**	0.24**
Canada	-0.06**	-0.08**	0.01	-0.00	0.31**
Chile	0.12**	0.18**	0.28**	0.19**	0.22**
China	0.21**	0.06*	0.20**	0.03	0.36**

TABLE 3 (Continued)

	Extra-role performance equity	Task performance equity	Need	Equality	Status
Columbia	0.07**	0.17**	0.09**	0.15**	-0.11**
Croatia	-0.32**	0.27**	0.08**	-0.18**	-0.24**
Finland	-0.05**	-0.48**	-0.14**	-0.03	0.35**
France	-0.10**	-0.09**	0.11**	-0.12**	0.17**
Germany	-0.43**	-0.14**	-0.38**	0.03	0.17**
Hong Kong	0.02	-0.10**	0.01	-0.09**	0.02
India	0.28**	0.24**	0.32**	0.05	0.29**
Ireland	0.03**	0.12**	0.15**	0.03*	-0.03
Mexico	0.06**	0.26**	0.34**	0.25**	0.26**
Nigeria	0.36**	0.24**	0.04	-0.38**	0.10*
Poland	0.28**	0.11**	-0.12**	-0.42**	0.23**
Portugal	0.17**	0.05**	-0.04*	0.25**	-0.08**
Singapore	-0.08**	0.04	0.09**	-0.05*	-0.06
South Africa	0.11**	0.22**	-0.00	-0.14**	-0.05*
Spain	-0.02	0.05*	0.16**	0.10**	-0.00
Switzerland	-0.04*	-0.05	0.02	-0.11**	0.27**
Taiwan	0.22**	0.09**	0.36**	0.11**	0.24**
Turkey	0.06**	-0.35**	-0.14**	0.16**	0.67**
USA	0.07**	0.33**	-0.27**	-0.53**	0.15**
Collectivism-individualism	0.06*	-0.06**	0.08**	0.08**	0.02
Power distance	0.05**	-0.01	0.03	-0.04*	0.14**
Masculinity-femininity	0.04	-0.04	0.08**	-0.08**	0.12**
Uncertainty avoidance	0.05	0.10**	-0.06**	0.03	-0.04

Note: $N = 3423$ employees. Values are standardized coefficients.

** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$.

tension, conflict, and reduced motivation might be the consequences if management practices and cultural value orientations do not match (Peretz et al., 2018).

Our findings also increase our understanding about the contingency perspective regarding the implementation of reward systems across cultures (e.g., Park & Nawakitphaitoon, 2018; Peretz et al., 2018; Stavrou et al., 2015). Specifically, we interpret our results in such a way that employees with more 'Americanized' values (i.e., high individualism, low power distance, and high masculinity) tend to prefer that rewards are allocated based on task performance. In contrast, employees with more 'equality' values (i.e., high collectivism, high femininity, and low power distance) tend to prefer that rewards are allocated equally. Reward systems should be therefore adapted in such a way that employees with more Americanized values are rewarded based on task performance, whereas employees with more 'equality' values are rewarded equally. Our findings also support the expectation of prior theoretical research that collectivism should predict a preference an equal reward allocation (Beugré, 2007; Bolino & Turnley, 2008; Leung, 2005). Further, employees with more 'traditional' values (i.e., high power distance and high masculinity) often prefer status and extra-role performance as a basis for allocations. For these employees, status, ascribed based on hierarchy, seniority, age, and tenure, may play an important role and represents an important decision-making criterion for reward allocations that managers can consider. Finally, employees with more 'paternalistic' values (i.e., high

masculinity and high collectivism) seem to prefer need as a criterion for reward allocations. These employees find it important that managers take an employee's personal situation and difficulties into account, when they distribute outcomes (Berman et al., 1985; Murphy-Berman & Berman, 2002).

Although the results supported many hypotheses, we also reported a few unexpected findings. Specifically, we found a positive effect of masculinity on preferring a need rule and a non-significant effect of masculinity on using task performance for allocations. It might be that employees with a masculinity orientation feel responsible to take care of employees with difficulties. Masculinity orientation seems to reflect to some extent the concept of paternalistic leadership, which is about taking care and protecting employees who experience personal difficulties (Pellegrini & Scandura, 2008). This would explain a preference for the need allocation rule.

Further, we provide an explanation for a theoretical puzzle of previous cross-cultural research on allocation rules (Bolino & Turnley, 2008; Gelfand et al., 2007; James, 2015). Previous research assumed that employees from collectivistic cultures prefer equality as the allocation rule, whereas employees from individualistic cultures seem to prefer the equity rule (Leung, 2005; Leung & Stephan, 2001; Steiner, 2001; Taras & Roney, 2008). At the same time, however, several studies reported non-significant results for the impact of individualism/collectivism on allocation rules (Bolino & Turnley, 2008; Fischer & Smith, 2003; Gelfand et al., 2007; James, 2015). To clarify these inconsistent results, we suggest that it might be necessary to distinguish between task and extra-role performance. Our study shows that employees with an individualism orientation are likely to prefer task performance as a basis for allocations, whereas employees with a collectivism orientation are likely to prefer extra-role performance.

7.2 | Practical implications

Aligned with a contingency perspective about adapting management practices across cultures (Olsen, 2015; Taras et al., 2011), we suggest that organisations adapt their reward allocation based on their employees' cultural value orientations. Multinational organisations need to be particularly sensitive to allocation rule issues because their workforce often has different cultural value orientations. It is very difficult to create an effective reward system when employees have different preferences for allocation rules. Organisations can therefore adapt their reward allocation across cultures based on their employees' cultural value orientations and their preferred allocation rule. In this way, it is more likely that employees will perceive fair allocations (Olsen, 2015) and that organisations will be successful in attracting and retaining high-qualified employees (Scott et al., 2015). Such adaptations may include different reward allocations in different workplaces and enable managers more flexibility regarding allocation rules. In addition to using task performance, our findings indicate that it might be useful for managers to use other criteria in specific countries (Beugré, 2007; Leung, 2005; Leung & Tong, 2004). Supervisors do not need to distribute outcomes among employees based on task performance to be perceived as effective and fair by employees. Supervisors might be also considered fair if they distribute outcomes based on equality or extra-role performance.

Supervisors could be also allowed to switch between different allocation rules depending on the specific workplace. Initial research on allocation rules has shown that equity is the most common rule for economic exchange relationships in organisations (Deutsch, 1975, 1985), whereas equality and need are often applied in close relationships (Deutsch, 1975, 1985; Leventhal, 1976). Depending on the organizational goals, equality and need can play an important role in the organizational context (Colquitt, Scott, et al., 2013; Kabanoff, 1991). For example, if organisations try to increase the harmony and the quality of interpersonal relationships to achieve its goals, the application of an equality rule might be helpful (Chen, 1995; Cropanzano et al., 2007; Kabanoff, 1991). Need could also be applied in the organizational context, if the organisation tries, for example, to emphasise personal development and welfare in the workplace (Colquitt & Jackson, 2006; Colquitt et al., 2005) as it was often the case during the COVID-19 pandemic.

A hybrid pay system could be another effective option. For example, 50% of an employee's pay could be allocated using the equity rule, while the other 50% could be allocated using the equality rule. Another hybrid system might be possible, based on task performance in combination with other criteria like status or need, depending on the

employees' cultural value orientations. Flexible and hybrid pay systems in multinational organisations could facilitate the integration of cultural differences when these organisations reward their cross-cultural workforce.

7.3 | Limitations and avenues for future research

Future research could analyse the impact of additional cultural value dimensions (see House et al., 2004; Maznevski et al., 2002; Schwartz, 1992) on allocation rules, followed by a comparison of their results with ours. This research can be complemented by other conceptualizations of culture (McSweeney, 2002) such as cultural rules (Fischer et al., 2009) or cultural beliefs (Leung et al., 2012). Future research could also try to increase the number of countries to more than 60 countries (House et al., 2004) to have a sufficiently large sample size at the country level to replicate our analysis at the country level. We explained and tested our hypotheses at the individual level. This reflects our primary research question: Why do individuals with different cultural backgrounds prefer different allocation rules?

Future research can also try to identify mechanisms and moderators to analyse if a specific context influences employees' preferences for allocation rules. Future research could also examine outcomes such as pay satisfaction and integrate research on social comparison (Kim et al., 2015), manager discretion (Hewett & Leroy, 2019), resource focus, and resource valence (Hu & Han, 2020).

To address common method variance, we had two surveys and a time lag of around 4 months between the surveys (Podsakoff et al., 2012). We also had a different question format for the scales to reduce common method bias (Podsakoff et al., 2012). Further, we asked employees to evaluate not only themselves (i.e., culture-inspired personal values) but also how supervisors should behave. Finally, we were interested in individual values, beliefs, and perceptions, requiring self-report measures for values and preferences for allocation rules (Brannick et al., 2010).

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CONFLICT OF INTEREST

The author declares that there is no conflict of interest that could be perceived as prejudicing the impartiality of the research reported.

DATA AVAILABILITY STATEMENT

The data that support the findings of this study are available on request from the corresponding author.

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APPENDIX

TABLE A 1 Means and standard deviations across countries

Country		Individualism- Collectivism	Power Distance	Masculinity- Femininity	Uncertainty Avoidance	Extra-role performance equity	Task performance equity	Need	Equality	Status
Argentina (N = 163)	Mean	2.81	2.75	2.21	4.21	3.85	4.53	2.90	3.86	2.88
	SD	0.55	0.62	0.77	0.46	0.69	0.51	0.86	0.92	0.84
Australia (N = 149)	Mean	2.60	2.56	2.31	4.36	3.67	4.38	2.58	3.85	2.63
	SD	0.58	0.70	0.85	0.51	0.77	0.64	0.87	0.88	0.84
Austria (N = 144)	Mean	3.00	2.36	2.21	3.88	3.27	4.29	2.39	3.97	2.62
	SD	0.74	0.67	0.76	0.51	0.61	0.73	0.77	0.87	0.80
Belgium (N = 163)	Mean	2.79	2.40	2.20	4.00	3.44	4.11	2.75	3.80	2.87
	SD	0.59	0.73	0.83	0.49	0.69	1.09	0.75	0.81	0.77
Brazil (N = 82)	Mean	3.59	2.32	2.17	4.51	4.17	4.43	2.49	4.25	2.81
	SD	0.90	0.72	0.85	0.54	0.62	0.87	0.97	0.80	0.94
Canada (N = 138)	Mean	2.59	2.54	2.19	4.34	3.58	4.30	2.68	3.94	2.93
	SD	0.53	0.66	0.85	0.48	0.73	0.61	0.83	0.80	0.79
Chile (N = 93)	Mean	3.38	2.61	2.07	4.33	3.84	4.53	2.98	4.19	2.80
	SD	0.67	0.66	0.72	0.46	0.63	0.58	0.93	0.85	0.76
China (N = 84)	Mean	3.73	2.76	3.23	4.28	4.04	4.39	3.07	3.97	3.14
	SD	0.73	0.84	0.77	0.48	0.61	0.55	0.75	0.75	0.79
Columbia (N = 100)	Mean	3.37	2.71	2.07	4.43	3.83	4.55	2.78	4.16	2.54
	SD	0.71	0.59	0.64	0.41	0.63	0.48	0.87	0.87	0.86
Croatia (N = 110)	Mean	3.27	2.27	2.42	4.11	3.22	4.58	2.83	3.81	2.38
	SD	0.71	0.54	0.64	0.41	0.57	0.61	0.75	0.78	0.76
Finland (N = 106)	Mean	3.38	1.96	2.34	4.15	3.64	3.89	2.61	4.04	2.95
	SD	0.74	0.57	0.78	0.57	0.82	0.83	0.93	0.92	0.85

(Continues)

TABLE A 1 (Continued)

Country		Individualism- Collectivism	Power Distance	Masculinity- Femininity	Uncertainty Avoidance	Extra-role performance equity	Task performance equity	Need	Equality	Status
France (N = 127)	Mean	3.27	2.33	1.94	3.98	3.56	4.25	2.84	3.89	2.77
	SD	0.85	0.60	0.63	0.51	0.60	1.01	0.74	0.80	0.81
Germany (N = 140)	Mean	3.15	2.35	2.11	3.80	3.04	4.15	2.32	4.04	2.77
	SD	0.62	0.64	0.67	0.61	0.70	0.81	0.79	0.83	0.86
Hong Kong (N = 180)	Mean	3.42	2.56	3.04	4.19	3.76	4.23	2.83	3.86	2.79
	SD	0.63	0.61	0.66	0.46	0.56	0.55	0.63	0.74	0.63
India (N = 83)	Mean	3.96	3.10	2.56	4.47	4.14	4.60	3.12	4.04	3.04
	SD	0.76	0.80	0.95	0.48	0.62	0.67	0.91	0.79	0.93
Ireland (N = 140)	Mean	3.33	2.65	2.26	4.39	3.75	4.46	2.89	4.05	2.64
	SD	0.81	0.68	0.80	0.50	0.71	0.65	0.89	0.78	0.83
Mexico (N = 176)	Mean	3.52	2.84	2.35	4.39	3.83	4.61	3.11	4.25	2.95
	SD	0.74	0.63	0.87	0.49	0.65	0.61	0.89	0.80	0.92
Nigeria (N = 74)	Mean	3.94	2.74	2.72	4.80	4.28	4.67	2.83	3.58	2.82
	SD	0.75	0.79	0.75	0.32	0.64	0.58	0.89	1.04	0.90
Poland (N = 72)	Mean	3.30	2.48	2.80	4.53	4.05	4.48	2.62	3.48	2.89
	SD	0.85	0.77	0.89	0.50	0.64	0.67	0.86	1.02	1.01
Portugal (N = 214)	Mean	3.30	2.18	1.98	4.45	3.89	4.44	2.63	4.35	2.46
	SD	0.83	0.67	0.72	0.45	0.62	0.69	0.86	0.80	0.91
Singapore (N = 170)	Mean	2.80	2.64	3.00	4.14	3.61	4.40	2.87	3.85	2.71
	SD	0.56	0.70	0.80	0.57	0.68	0.67	0.85	0.86	0.86
South Africa (N = 96)	Mean	3.18	2.63	2.27	4.53	3.86	4.61	2.72	3.85	2.60
	SD	0.80	0.65	0.77	0.45	0.73	0.55	0.82	0.87	0.90

TABLE A 1 (Continued)

Country		Individualism- Collectivism	Power Distance	Masculinity- Femininity	Uncertainty Avoidance	Extra-role performance equity	Task performance equity	Need	Equality	Status
Spain (N = 191)	Mean	3.54	2.58	1.96	4.16	3.64	4.36	2.88	4.12	2.61
	SD	0.72	0.66	0.72	0.46	0.67	0.66	0.85	0.87	0.83
Switzerland (N = 104)	Mean	3.45	2.36	2.12	3.96	3.62	4.25	2.74	3.86	2.87
	SD	0.76	0.64	0.74	0.51	0.65	1.06	0.71	0.84	0.75
Taiwan (N = 118)	Mean	3.58	2.35	2.76	4.32	4.01	4.45	3.16	4.11	2.89
	SD	0.74	0.67	0.72	0.49	0.61	0.55	0.77	0.75	0.74
Turkey (N = 89)	Mean	3.78	2.40	2.61	4.47	3.80	4.02	2.61	4.22	3.30
	SD	0.81	0.78	0.82	0.40	0.71	0.89	0.93	0.73	0.85
UK (N = 86)	Mean	3.37	2.37	2.21	4.34	3.67	4.34	2.72	4.02	2.59
	SD	0.72	0.64	0.78	0.54	0.64	0.57	0.86	0.89	0.68
USA (N = 31)	Mean	3.23	2.28	2.01	4.31	3.73	4.62	2.40	3.34	2.69
	SD	0.92	0.72	0.69	0.53	0.63	0.51	0.80	0.99	0.78
Total (N = 3423)	Mean	3.26	2.50	2.35	4.25	3.71	4.38	2.77	3.99	2.77
	SD	0.79	0.70	0.84	0.53	0.71	0.71	0.85	0.86	0.85