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Foundations of Environmental Economics

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Contents

1	Introduction: Economics and Environmental Degradation	1
1.1	Thesis 1	3
1.2	Thesis 2	7
1.3	Thesis 3	9
	References	11
2	Environmental Externalities and Their Internalization Through Voluntary Approaches	13
2.1	The Socially Optimal Pollution Level in Case of a Unilateral Externality	14
2.2	Ways to Internalize Externalities	16
2.2.1	The Coase Theorem	16
2.2.2	Other Voluntary Approaches	30
	Appendix: Multilateral Externalities, Public Goods, and Mixed Goods	32
	References	35
3	Monetary Valuation of the Environment	37
3.1	Theoretical Background	38
3.1.1	Price Changes	38
3.1.2	Quantity Changes	46
3.2	The Contingent Valuation Method: Measuring Utility by Means of Surveys	47
3.2.1	The Idea	47
3.2.2	The Procedure	50
3.2.3	Problems with Contingent Valuation Studies	51
3.2.4	Conclusions for the Design and Validity of CVM Studies	62
	References	65
4	A Comparison of Environmental Policy Instruments	67
4.1	Background	69
4.2	Command and Control Instruments	70
4.2.1	Types of Command and Control Instruments	70
4.2.2	Advantages and Disadvantages of Command and Control Instruments	70
4.3	Advantages of Environmental Taxes	75
4.3.1	Cost-Effectiveness in Abating Emissions ("Static Efficiency")	75
4.3.2	Stronger Incentives for Innovation ("Dynamic Efficiency")	77
4.4	Problems with Environmental Taxation	80
4.4.1	Differences of Environmental Impact	80
4.4.2	Unknown Marginal Abatement Costs	82
4.4.3	Effects of Environmental Taxation in Case of a Supplier's Monopoly	86

4.4.4	The Possibility of Rising Emissions Through Environmental Taxation	89
4.4.5	An Excessive Dynamic Incentive Effect	93
4.4.6	Welfare Losses Due to the Double Burden of Environmental Taxes	94
4.5	The Double Dividend Hypothesis: The Idea of “Greening” the Tax System	98
4.5.1	The Idea of the Double Dividend	98
4.5.2	The Level of the Optimal Environmental Tax When the Double Dividend Is Taken into Account	100
4.5.3	Challenging the Existence of Double Dividends	102
4.5.4	Conflicts of Environmental Taxes with Other Economic Objectives	107
4.6	Emission Trading: An Alternative Incentive-Based Instrument of Environmental Policy	110
4.6.1	The Functioning and the Prospective Advantages of Cap-and-Trade Systems	111
4.6.2	Dynamic Efficiency of Permit Schemes	116
4.6.3	Problems with Emission Trading	119
4.6.4	Cap-and-Trade Systems in Practice	125
4.7	The Limits of Emission Pricing: An Integrated View of Instrument Choice in Environmental Policy	129
	References	131
5	International Environmental Problems	133
5.1	Introduction	134
5.2	A Two-Country Game with a Reciprocal Externality: Payoff Structure and Nash Equilibria	135
5.2.1	The Model	135
5.2.2	Payoff Rankings and Country Types	136
5.2.3	Explanation of Country Types	137
5.2.4	Nash Equilibria	138
5.3	Transformations of the One-Shot Game	140
5.3.1	Changes of Abatement Costs	140
5.3.2	Extended Preferences	144
5.4	Repeated Games	146
5.5	Success Factors of International Environmental Cooperation: Two Examples	151
	References	154
	Supplementary Information	
	Index	159