The Econometric Analysis of Network Data

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Contents

Preface ix
List of contributors xi

1. Introduction
Bryan S. Graham and Áureo de Paula

Paths, distance and diameter 4
Measuring homophily 8
Measuring agent centrality 10
Degree centrality 10
Refinements of degree centrality 11
Katz–Bonacich centrality 18
Outdegree-based centrality measures 19
References 20

2. Dyadic regression
Bryan S. Graham

2.1 Population and sampling framework 25
Sampling assumption 27
2.2 Composite likelihood 28
2.3 Limit distribution 29
Variance calculation 31
Variance estimation 34
Limit distribution 35
2.4 Empirical illustration 35
Monte Carlo experiment 36
2.5 Further reading 37
Appendix 2.A Derivations 38
References 39

3. Strategic network formation
Áureo de Paula

3.1 Basic ingredients of the environment 42
3.2 Relation to empirical games 46

3.3 Network formation 49
3.3.1 Iterative network formation 49
3.3.2 Non-iterative network formation 53
3.4 Concluding remarks 59
References 59

4. Testing for externalities in network formation using simulation
Bryan S. Graham and Andrin Pelican

A strategic network formation game with transfers 65
Test formulation 68
Similarity of the test 70
Choosing the test statistic 71
Simulating undirected networks with fixed degree 73
The algorithm 74
Importance sampling 76
Illustration using the Nyakatoke network 79
References 81

5. Econometric analysis of bipartite networks
Stéphane Bonhomme

5.1 Introduction 83
5.2 Bipartite network models: the linear case 87
5.2.1 Bipartite networks 87
5.2.2 Fixed effects: the AKM estimator 89
5.2.3 Random-effect approaches 92
5.3 Identification in nonlinear models 97
5.3.1 Motivation for nonlinearity 97
5.3.2 Identification in one-sided random effects 99
5.3.3 Identification in two-sided random effects 101
5.4 Estimation in nonlinear models 104
5.4.1 Fixed-effect and random-effect approaches 104
5.4.2 Discrete heterogeneity I: finite mixture methods 105
5.4.3 Discrete heterogeneity II: classification-based methods 107
5.5 Endogenous link formation and network dynamics 113
5.5.1 A static model of network formation 113
5.5.2 Network dynamics and externalities 114
5.6 Conclusion 116
References 116

6. An empirical model for strategic network formation
Nicholas Christakis, James Fowler, Guido W. Imbens, and Karthik Kalyanaraman

6.1 Introduction 123

6.2 Set up 126
6.3 Exponential random graph and strategic network formation models 128
6.3.1 Exponential random graph models 128
6.3.2 Strategic network formation models 129
6.4 The model 130
6.4.1 Opportunities for establishing links 131
6.4.2 Link formation 132
6.4.3 Preferences 133
6.4.4 The likelihood function 135
6.5 Markov-chain-Monte-Carlo methods 138
6.5.1 Drawing from the posterior distribution of the parameters given the augmented data 138
6.5.2 Updating the sequence of opportunities 139
6.6 An application to high school friendships 140
6.6.1 Data 140
6.6.2 Estimation and inference 142
6.6.3 Goodness of fit 145
6.6.4 The effect of single-sex classrooms on network formation 145
6.7 Conclusion 146
References 147

7. Econometric analysis of models with social interactions
Brendan Kline and Elie Tamer

7.1 Introduction 149
7.2 Identification of models of social interactions 151
7.2.1 The linear-in-means model 151
7.2.2 Non-linear models 158
7.2.3 Response functions 160
7.2.4 Treatment effects mediated through networks 162
7.2.5 Other approaches to identification 166
7.3 Specification of models of social interactions 168
7.3.1 Empirical individual treatment response 168
7.3.2 Empirical group treatment response 169
7.3.3 Recap 170
7.3.4 Immunization and infectious disease with social interaction 171
7.4 Policy relevance of models of social interactions 176
References 177

8. Many player asymptotics for large network formation problems
Konrad Menzel

8.1 Introduction 183

8.2 Model 185
8.2.1 Data 185
8.2.2 Link preferences 185
8.2.3 Network statistics 186
8.2.4 Payoff specification 187
8.2.5 Solution concept 189
8.2.6 Tâtonnement and equilibrium selection 191
8.3 Many player asymptotics for economic models 192
8.3.1 Asymptotic sequence 193
8.3.2 Cross-sectional dependence 195
8.3.3 Asymptotic independence of η_{ij} and $W_i(\mathbf{D}^*)$ 197
8.3.4 Limiting approximations to model components 198
8.4 Limiting model 203
8.4.1 Link frequency distribution. 204
8.4.2 Unique edge-level response 205
8.4.3 Equilibrium selection 206
8.4.4 Convergence results 206
8.5 Identification and estimation 207
8.5.1 Identification 208
8.5.2 Maximum likelihood estimation 210
8.6 Conclusion 214
Appendix 8.A Bounds for set-valued edge-level response 215
8.A.1 Set-valued edge-level response 215
8.A.2 Set estimation and bounds 216
Appendix 8.B Convergence of link formation probabilities to logit 220
References 221

Index 225