

Peter Brusov • Tatiana Filatova •  
Natali Orekhova • Mukhadin Eskindarov

# Modern Corporate Finance, Investments, Taxation and Ratings

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# Contents

## Part I Corporate Finance

<b>1</b>	<b>Introduction</b> . . . . .	3
	References . . . . .	6
<b>2</b>	<b>Capital Structure: Modigliani–Miller Theory</b> . . . . .	9
2.1	Introduction . . . . .	9
2.2	The Traditional Approach . . . . .	10
2.3	Modigliani–Miller Theory . . . . .	11
2.3.1	Modigliani–Miller Theory Without Taxes . . . . .	11
2.3.2	Modigliani–Miller Theory with Taxes . . . . .	13
2.3.3	Main Assumptions of Modigliani–Miller Theory . . . . .	16
2.3.4	Modifications of Modigliani–Miller Theory . . . . .	17
	References . . . . .	27
<b>3</b>	<b>Modern Theory of Capital Cost and Capital Structure:</b>	
	<b>Brusov–Filatova–Orekhova Theory (BFO Theory)</b> . . . . .	29
3.1	Companies of Arbitrary Age and Companies with Arbitrary Lifetime: Brusov–Filatova–Orekhova Equation . . . . .	30
3.2	Comparison of Modigliani–Miller Results (Perpetuity Company) with Myers Results (1-Year Company) and Brusov–Filatova– Orekhova Ones (Company of Arbitrary Age) . . . . .	32
3.3	Brusov–Filatova–Orekhova Theorem . . . . .	36
3.4	From Modigliani–Miller to General Theory of Capital Cost and Capital Structure . . . . .	40
3.5	BFO Theory in the Case, When the Company Ceased to Exist at the Time Moment $n$ (BFO-2 Theory) . . . . .	43
3.5.1	Application of Formula BFO-2 . . . . .	44
3.5.2	Comparison of Results Obtained from Formulas BFO and BFO-2 . . . . .	46

3.6	Conclusions . . . . .	47
	References . . . . .	49
<b>4</b>	<b>Bankruptcy of the Famous Trade-Off Theory . . . . .</b>	<b>51</b>
4.1	Optimal Capital Structure of the Company . . . . .	51
4.2	Absence of the Optimal Capital Structure in Modified Modigliani–Miller Theory (MMM Theory) . . . . .	54
4.3	Analysis of the Trade-Off Theory Within the Brusov–Filatova– Orehkova Theory . . . . .	55
4.4	The Causes of Absence of the Optimum Capital Structure in the Trade-Off Theory . . . . .	74
4.5	Conclusion . . . . .	95
	References . . . . .	96
<b>5</b>	<b>New Mechanism of Formation of the Company’s Optimal Capital Structure, Different from Suggested by Trade-Off Theory . . . . .</b>	<b>99</b>
5.1	Absence of Suggested Mechanism of Formation of the Company’s Optimal Capital Structure Within Modified Modigliani–Miller Theory (MMM Theory) . . . . .	99
5.2	Formation of the Company’s Optimal Capital Structure Within Brusov–Filatova–Orehkova (BFO) Theory . . . . .	100
5.3	Simple Model of Proposed Mechanism . . . . .	113
5.4	Conclusion . . . . .	115
	References . . . . .	116
<b>6</b>	<b>The Global Causes of the Global Financial Crisis . . . . .</b>	<b>119</b>
	References . . . . .	124
<b>7</b>	<b>The Role of Taxing and Leverage in Evaluation of Capital Cost and Capitalization of the Company . . . . .</b>	<b>125</b>
7.1	The Role of Taxes in Modigliani–Miller Theory . . . . .	126
7.2	The Role of Taxes in Brusov–Filatova–Orehkova Theory . . . . .	129
7.2.1	Weighted Average Cost of Capital (WACC) of the Company . . . . .	130
7.2.2	Equity Cost $k_e$ of the Company . . . . .	132
7.2.3	Dependence of WACC and $k_e$ on the Age of Company . . . . .	135
7.3	Conclusions . . . . .	138
	References . . . . .	139
<b>8</b>	<b>A Qualitatively New Effect in Corporate Finance: Abnormal Dependence of Equity Cost of Company on Leverage . . . . .</b>	<b>141</b>
8.1	Introduction . . . . .	141
8.2	Equity Cost in the Modigliani–Miller Theory . . . . .	141
8.3	Equity Cost Capital Within Brusov–Filatova–Orehkova Theory . . . . .	145
8.3.1	Dependence of Equity Cost $k_e$ on Tax on Profit Rate $T$ at Different Fixed Leverage Level $L$ . . . . .	146

8.3.2	Dependence of Equity Cost $k_e$ on Leverage Level $L$ (the Share of Debt Capital $w_d$ ) at Different Fixed Tax on Profit Rate $T$ . . . . .	148
8.4	Dependence of the Critical Value of Tax on Profit Rate $T^*$ on Parameters $n, k_0$ , and $k_d$ of the Company . . . . .	150
8.5	Practical Value of Effect . . . . .	153
8.6	Equity Cost of a 1-Year Company . . . . .	154
8.7	Conclusions . . . . .	157
	References . . . . .	158
<b>9</b>	<b>Inflation in Brusov–Filatova–Orekhova Theory and in Its Perpetuity Limit Modigliani–Miller Theory</b> . . . . .	161
9.1	Introduction . . . . .	161
9.2	Accounting of Inflation in the Modigliani–Miller Theory Without Taxes . . . . .	162
9.3	Accounting of Inflation in Modigliani–Miller Theory with Corporate Taxes . . . . .	166
9.4	Accounting of Inflation in Brusov–Filatova–Orekhova Theory with Corporate Taxes . . . . .	168
9.4.1	Generalized Brusov–Filatova–Orekhova Theorem . . . . .	168
9.5	Generalized Brusov–Filatova–Orekhova Formula Under Existence of Inflation . . . . .	169
9.6	Irregular Inflation . . . . .	176
9.7	Inflation Rate for a Few Periods . . . . .	177
9.8	Conclusions . . . . .	178
	References . . . . .	179
 <b>Part II Investments</b>		
<b>10</b>	<b>A Portfolio of Two Securities</b> . . . . .	183
10.1	A Portfolio of Two Securities . . . . .	183
10.1.1	A Case of Complete Correlation . . . . .	183
10.1.2	Case of Complete Anticorrelation . . . . .	185
10.1.3	Independent Securities . . . . .	186
10.1.4	Three Independent Securities . . . . .	188
10.2	Risk-Free Security . . . . .	191
10.3	Portfolio of a Given Yield (or Given Risk) . . . . .	193
10.3.1	Case of Complete Correlation ( $\rho_{12} = 1$ ) and Complete Anticorrelation ( $\rho_{12} = -1$ ) . . . . .	194
	References . . . . .	195
<b>11</b>	<b>Investment Models with Debt Repayment at the End of the Project and Their Application</b> . . . . .	197
11.1	Investment Models . . . . .	197
11.2	The Effectiveness of the Investment Project from the Perspective of the Equity Holders Only . . . . .	198
11.2.1	With the Division of Credit and Investment Flows . . . . .	198

11.3	Without Flows Separation . . . . .	200
11.4	Modigliani–Miller Limit (Perpetuity Projects) . . . . .	201
11.4.1	With Flows Separation . . . . .	201
11.4.2	Without Flows Separation . . . . .	202
11.5	The Effectiveness of the Investment Project from the Perspective of the Owners of Equity and Debt . . . . .	203
11.5.1	With Flows Separation . . . . .	203
11.5.2	Without Flows Separation . . . . .	204
11.6	Modigliani–Miller Limit . . . . .	205
11.6.1	With Flows Separation . . . . .	205
11.6.2	Without Flows Separation . . . . .	206
	References . . . . .	207
<b>12</b>	<b>Influence of Debt Financing on the Efficiency of Investment Projects: The Analysis of Efficiency of Investment Projects Within the Perpetuity (Modigliani–Miller) Approximation . . . . .</b>	<b>209</b>
12.1	The Effectiveness of the Investment Project from the Perspective of the Equity Holders Only . . . . .	209
12.1.1	With the Division of Credit and Investment Flows . . . . .	209
12.1.2	Without Flows Separation . . . . .	217
12.2	The Effectiveness of the Investment Project from the Perspective of the Equity and Debt Owners . . . . .	225
12.2.1	With the Division of Credit and Investment Flows . . . . .	225
12.2.2	Without Flows Separation . . . . .	233
	References . . . . .	241
<b>13</b>	<b>The Analysis of the Exploration of Efficiency of Investment Projects of Arbitrary Duration (Within Brusov–Filatova– Orekhova Theory) . . . . .</b>	<b>243</b>
13.1	The Effectiveness of the Investment Project from the Perspective of the Equity Holders Only . . . . .	243
13.1.1	With the Division of Credit and Investment Flows . . . . .	243
13.1.2	Without Flow Separation . . . . .	250
13.2	The Effectiveness of the Investment Project from the Perspective of the Owners of Equity and Debt . . . . .	258
13.2.1	With the Division of Credit and Investment Flows . . . . .	258
13.2.2	Without Flow Separation . . . . .	266
13.3	The Elaboration of Recommendations on the Capital Structure of Investment of Enterprises, Companies, Taking into Account All the Key Financial Parameters of Investment Project . . . . .	273
13.3.1	General Conclusions and Recommendations on the Definition of Capital Structure of Investment of Enterprises . . . . .	273
	References . . . . .	275

**14 Investment Models with Uniform Debt Repayment and Their Application** . . . . . 277

14.1 Investment Models with Uniform Debt Repayment . . . . . 277

14.2 The Effectiveness of the Investment Project  
 from the Perspective of the Equity Holders Only . . . . . 279

    14.2.1 With the Division of Credit and Investment Flows . . . . . 279

    14.2.2 Without Flows Separation . . . . . 280

14.3 The Effectiveness of the Investment Project  
 from the Perspective of the Owners of Equity and Debt . . . . . 281

    14.3.1 With Flows Separation . . . . . 281

    14.3.2 Without Flows Separation . . . . . 281

14.4 Example of the Application of the Derived Formulas . . . . . 282

14.5 Conclusions . . . . . 283

References . . . . . 284

**Part III Taxation**

**15 Is It Possible to Increase Taxing and Conserve a Good Investment Climate in the Country?** . . . . . 287

15.1 Influence of Tax on Profit Rates on the Efficiency  
 of the Investment Projects . . . . . 287

15.2 Investment Models . . . . . 289

15.3 Borrowings Abroad . . . . . 292

15.4 Dependence of NPV on Tax on Profit Rate at Different  
 Leverage Levels . . . . . 293

15.5 At a Constant Value of Equity Capital ( $S = \text{Const}$ ) . . . . . 294

15.6 Without Flow Separation . . . . . 296

    15.6.1 At a Constant Value of the Total Invested Capital  
     ( $I = \text{Const}$ ) . . . . . 296

    15.6.2 At a Constant Value of Equity Capital ( $S = \text{Const}$ ) . . . . . 298

15.7 Conclusions . . . . . 300

References . . . . . 300

**16 Is It Possible to Increase the Investment Efficiency by Increasing Tax on Profit Rate? An Abnormal Influence of the Growth of Tax on Profit Rate on the Efficiency of the Investment** . . . . . 303

16.1 Dependence of NPV on Leverage Level  $L$  at Fixed Levels  
 of Tax on Profit Rate  $t$  . . . . . 303

    16.1.1 The Effectiveness of the Investment Project  
     from the Perspective of the Equity Holders Only . . . . . 303

    16.1.2 The Effectiveness of the Investment Project  
     from the Perspective of the Equity and Debt  
     Holders . . . . . 314

16.2	Dependence of NPV on Tax on Profit Rate at Fixed Leverage Levels $L$ . . . . .	321
16.2.1	The Effectiveness of the Investment Project from the Perspective of the Equity Holders Only . . . . .	321
16.2.2	The Effectiveness of the Investment Project from the Perspective of the Equity and Debt Holders . . . . .	328
	References . . . . .	335
<b>17</b>	<b>Optimizing the Investment Structure of the Telecommunication Sector Company</b> . . . . .	<b>337</b>
17.1	Introduction . . . . .	337
17.2	Investment Analysis and Recommendations for Telecommunication Company “Nastcom Plus” . . . . .	338
17.2.1	The Dependence of NPV on Investment Capital Structure . . . . .	339
17.2.2	The Dependence of NPV on the Equity Capital Value and Coefficient $\beta$ . . . . .	348
17.3	Effects of Taxation on the Optimal Capital Structure of Companies in the Telecommunication Sector . . . . .	354
17.4	Conclusions . . . . .	365
	References . . . . .	366
<b>18</b>	<b>The Golden Age of the Company (Three Colors of Company’s Time)</b> . . . . .	<b>367</b>
18.1	Introduction . . . . .	368
18.2	Dependence of WACC on the Age of the Company $n$ at Different Leverage Levels . . . . .	371
18.3	Dependence of WACC on the Age of the Company $n$ at Different Values of Capital Costs (Equity, $k_0$ , and Debt, $k_d$ ) and Fixed Leverage Levels . . . . .	373
18.4	Dependence of WACC on the Age of the Company $n$ at Different Values of Debt Capital Cost, $k_d$ , and Fixed Equity Cost, $k_0$ , and Fixed Leverage Levels . . . . .	375
18.5	Dependence of WACC on the Age of the Company $n$ at Different Values of Equity Cost, $k_0$ , and Fixed Debt Capital Cost, $k_d$ , and Fixed Leverage Levels . . . . .	379
18.6	Dependence of WACC on the Age of the Company $n$ at High Values of Capital Cost (Equity, $k_0$ , and Debt, $k_d$ ) and High Lifetime of the Company . . . . .	380
18.7	Further Investigation of Effect . . . . .	389
18.8	Conclusions . . . . .	391
	References . . . . .	393

**19 A “Golden Age” of the Companies: Conditions of Its Existence . . . 395**

19.1 Introduction . . . . . 396

19.2 Companies Without the “Golden Age” (Large Difference Between  $k_0$  and  $k_d$  Costs) . . . . . 397

19.2.1 Dependence of the Weighted Average Cost of Capital, WACC, on the Company Age  $n$  at Different Leverage Levels . . . . . 397

19.3 Companies with the “Golden Age” (Small Difference Between  $k_0$  and  $k_d$  Costs) . . . . . 399

19.4 Companies with Abnormal “Golden Age” (Intermediate Difference Between  $k_0$  and  $k_d$  Costs) . . . . . 403

19.5 Comparing with Results from Previous Chapter . . . . . 410

19.5.1 Under Change of the Debt Capital Cost,  $k_d$  . . . . . 410

19.5.2 Under Change of the Equity Capital Cost,  $k_0$  . . . . . 411

19.6 Conclusions . . . . . 411

References . . . . . 414

**20 The Role of the Central Bank and Commercial Banks in Creating and Maintaining a Favorable Investment Climate in the Country . . . . . 415**

20.1 Introduction . . . . . 415

20.2 Investment Models with Debt Repayment at the End of the Project . . . . . 416

20.2.1 The Effectiveness of the Investment Project from the Perspective of the Equity Holders Only (Without Flow Separation) . . . . . 417

20.3 Modigliani–Miller Limit (Long-Term (Perpetuity) Projects) . . . . 419

20.3.1 The Dependence of the Efficiency of Investments NPV on the Level of Debt Financing  $L$  for the Values of Equity Costs  $k_0 = 0.2$  . . . . . 419

20.3.2 The Dependence of the Efficiency of Investments NPV on the Level of Debt Financing  $L$  for the Value of Equity Costs  $k_0 = 0.28$  . . . . . 422

20.4 Projects of Finite (Arbitrary) Duration . . . . . 424

20.4.1 The Dependence of the Efficiency of Investments NPV on the Level of Debt Financing  $L$  for the Values of Equity Costs  $k_0 = 0.2$  . . . . . 424

20.4.2 The Dependence of the Efficiency of Investments NPV on the Level of Debt Financing  $L$  for the Values of Equity Costs  $k_0 = 0.28$  . . . . . 428

20.5 The Dependence of the Net Present Value, NPV, on the Leverage Level  $l$  for Projects of Different Durations . . . . 430

20.6 Conclusions . . . . . 435

References . . . . . 437



## Part IV Ratings and Rating Methodologies

<b>21</b>	<b>Rating: New Approach</b> . . . . .	441
21.1	Introduction . . . . .	441
21.2	The Closeness of the Rating Agencies . . . . .	442
21.3	The Use of Discounting in the Rating . . . . .	442
21.4	Incorporation of Parameters, Used in Ratings, into Perpetuity Limit of Modern Theory of Capital Structure by Brusov–Filatova–Orekhova . . . . .	443
21.5	Models . . . . .	443
21.5.1	One-Period Model . . . . .	444
21.5.2	Multi-period Model . . . . .	444
21.6	Theory of Incorporation of Parameters, Used in Ratings, into Perpetuity Limit of Modern Theory of Capital Structure by Brusov–Filatova–Orekhova . . . . .	445
21.6.1	Coverage Ratios . . . . .	445
21.6.2	More Detailed Consideration . . . . .	448
21.6.3	Leverage Ratios . . . . .	450
21.7	Equity Cost . . . . .	453
21.8	How to Evaluate the Discount Rate? . . . . .	464
21.8.1	Using One Ratio . . . . .	465
21.8.2	Using a Few Ratios . . . . .	465
21.9	Influence of Leverage Level . . . . .	465
21.9.1	The Dependence of Equity Cost $k_e$ on Leverage Level at Two Coverage Ratio Values $i_j = 1$ and $i_j = 2$ . . . . .	465
21.10	The Dependence of Equity Cost $k_e$ on Leverage Level at Two Leverage Ratio Values $l_j = 1$ and $l_j = 2$ . . . . .	468
21.11	Conclusion . . . . .	472
	References . . . . .	473
<b>22</b>	<b>Rating Methodology: New Look and New Horizons</b> . . . . .	475
22.1	Introduction . . . . .	475
22.2	The Analysis of Methodological and Systemic Deficiencies in the Existing Credit Rating of Nonfinancial Issuers . . . . .	476
22.2.1	The Closeness of the Rating Agencies . . . . .	476
22.2.2	Discounting . . . . .	476
22.2.3	Dividend Policy of the Company . . . . .	477
22.2.4	Leverage Level . . . . .	478
22.2.5	Taxation . . . . .	478
22.2.6	Account of the Industrial Specifics of the Issuer . . . . .	479
22.2.7	Neglect of Taking into Account the Particularities of the Issuer . . . . .	479
22.2.8	Financial Ratios . . . . .	479

- 22.3 Modification of the BFO Theory for Companies and Corporations of Arbitrary Age for Purposes of Ranking . . . . 481
- 22.4 Coverage Ratios . . . . . 482
  - 22.4.1 Coverage Ratios of Debt . . . . . 483
  - 22.4.2 The Coverage Ratio on Interest on the Credit . . . . . 483
  - 22.4.3 Coverage Ratios of Debt and Interest on the Credit (New Ratios) . . . . . 485
  - 22.4.4 All Three Coverage Ratios Together . . . . . 487
- 22.5 Coverage Ratios (Different Capital Cost Values) . . . . . 490
  - 22.5.1 Coverage Ratios of Debt . . . . . 490
  - 22.5.2 The Coverage Ratio on Interest on the Credit . . . . . 492
  - 22.5.3 Coverage Ratios of Debt and Interest on the Credit (New Ratios) . . . . . 493
  - 22.5.4 Analysis and Conclusions . . . . . 495
- 22.6 Leverage Ratios . . . . . 496
  - 22.6.1 Leverage Ratios for Debt . . . . . 496
  - 22.6.2 Leverage Ratios for Interest on Credit . . . . . 498
- 22.7 Leverage Ratios (Different Capital Costs) . . . . . 499
  - 22.7.1 Leverage Ratios for Debt . . . . . 499
  - 22.7.2 Leverage Ratios for Interests on Credit . . . . . 500
  - 22.7.3 Leverage Ratios for Debt and Interests on Credit . . . . 500
  - 22.7.4 Analysis and Conclusions . . . . . 500
- 22.8 Conclusions . . . . . 509
- References . . . . . 509
- 23 Ratings of Long-Term Projects: A New Approach . . . . . 511**
  - 23.1 Investment Models . . . . . 512
    - 23.1.1 The Effectiveness of the Investment Project from the Perspective of the Equity Holders Only (Without Flows Separation) . . . . . 512
    - 23.1.2 Modigliani–Miller Limit [Long-Term (Perpetuity) Projects] . . . . . 513
  - 23.2 Incorporation of Financial Coefficients, Used in Project Rating, into Modern Investment Models . . . . . 514
    - 23.2.1 Coverage Ratios . . . . . 514
    - 23.2.2 Leverage Ratios . . . . . 516
  - 23.3 Dependence of NPV on Coverage Ratios . . . . . 517
    - 23.3.1 Coverage Ratio on Debt . . . . . 517
  - 23.4 Dependence of NPV on Leverage Ratios . . . . . 522
    - 23.4.1 Leverage Ratio of Debt . . . . . 522
  - 23.5 Conclusions . . . . . 533
  - References . . . . . 535

**24 New Meaningful Effects in Modern Capital Structure Theory . . . . 537**

24.1 Introduction . . . . . 537

24.2 Comparison of Modigliani–Miller (MM) and Brusov–Filatova–Orekhova (BFO) Results . . . . . 539

24.2.1 The Traditional Approach . . . . . 539

24.2.2 Modigliani–Miller Theory . . . . . 540

24.3 Comparison of Modigliani–Miller Results (Perpetuity Company) with Myers Results (1-Year Company) and Brusov–Filatova–Orekhova Ones (Company of Arbitrary Age) . . . . . 542

24.4 Bankruptcy of the Famous Trade-Off Theory . . . . . 544

24.5 The Qualitatively New Effect in Corporate Finance . . . . . 546

24.5.1 Perpetuity Modigliani–Miller Limit . . . . . 548

24.5.2 BFO Theory . . . . . 549

24.6 Conclusions . . . . . 550

24.7 Mechanism of Formation of the Company Optimal Capital Structure . . . . . 551

24.8 “A Golden Age” of the Company . . . . . 554

24.9 Inflation in Modigliani–Miller and BFO Theories . . . . . 557

24.10 Effects, Connected with Tax Shields, Taxes, and Leverage . . . . 560

24.11 Effects, Connected with the Influence of Tax on Profit Rate on Effectiveness of Investment Projects . . . . . 561

24.12 Influence of Growth of Tax on Profit Rate . . . . . 561

24.13 New Approach to Ratings . . . . . 564

24.13.1 New Approach to Ratings: The Creditworthiness of the Non-Finance Issuers . . . . . 564

24.13.2 New Approach to Long-Term Project Ratings . . . . . 566

References . . . . . 567

**25 Conclusion . . . . . 569**

References . . . . . 570